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The Psychology of Patent Protection 
STEPHANIE PLAMONDON BAIR 
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of the major 
justifications for our patent system using a behavioral psychology 
framework. Applying insights from the behavioral literature that I argue 
more accurately account for the realities of human action than previous 
analytical tools, I critically evaluate each of the major justifications for 
patents—incentive theory, disclosure theory, prospect theory, 
commercialization theory, patent racing theory, and non-utilitarian 
theories. I ask whether our current patent system is an effective regime for 
meeting the stated goals of these accounts. When the answer to this 
question is no, I again turn to the behavioral literature to provide 
suggestions for how we might better achieve these goals. The results of this 
analysis suggest that our current patent system is best justified under the 
commercialization account. Surprisingly, my analysis also suggests that 
many of the behaviors and outcomes we hope to encourage through 
patents might more effectively be accomplished using less socially costly 
non-financial incentives. 
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The Psychology of Patent Protection 
STEPHANIE PLAMONDON BAIR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property rights, including patent rights, play a significant 
role in the American innovation landscape. But why, exactly, do we grant 
patent monopolies?  
To begin to answer this question, imagine that you are an inventor, 
working independently or as a founder of a small start-up company. What 
role, if any, does the patent system play in your decision-making as you 
proceed through the creative process?  
Maybe the prospect of a patent provides the financial encouragement 
you need to invent something in the first place—a patent will allow you to 
protect your intellectual labor and hopefully make some money from your 
idea. Or maybe it encourages you to share the details of your invention 
with others—you would prefer to keep your idea secret, but choose to 
reveal it in exchange for the limited monopoly and corresponding financial 
returns a patent promises. Perhaps the prospect of monopoly profits will 
encourage you to make, or help you attract, the investments needed to turn 
your idea into a marketable product. Or maybe you would conceive, 
disclose, and commercialize your idea even without the patent incentive, 
but you nevertheless think that your idea deserves protection because you 
are personally attached to it, or because you believe it is a just reward for 
your contribution to society.    
These are some of the reasons scholars have given to explain why we 
grant patent monopolies. But how can we know if our patent system 
actually works in the way these theories suggest? For instance, consider the 
predominant justification for the patent system: that a patent encourages 
people to invent things they would not invent without a patent. How can 
we know whether this actually happens in a typical case?  
Patent scholars have traditionally answered this question using 
economic analyses, which assume that actors within the system behave 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, BYU Law School. Thank you to Hank Greely, Matthew Jennejohn, 
Dmitry Karshtedt, Lucas Osborn, Gordon Smith, David Studdart, participants in the 2015 Works in 
Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at The George Washington University Law School, and 
participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop for valuable input on earlier drafts. 
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rationally.1 Indeed, many of the justifications for patents were developed 
based on this assumption.  
But it is well known that people do not behave like rational actors.2 In 
fact, a vast behavioral psychology literature reveals that people repeatedly 
depart from rational utility-maximizing behavior, and that they do so in 
predictable ways.3 Many of these well-studied behavioral trends take place 
in creative and innovative contexts. The behavioral literature, then, offers 
an alternative way to evaluate patent theories.  
The time is ripe for reevaluating these justifications as the traditional 
view that patent rights optimally promote innovation is being challenged 
from a number of directions. Scholars, practitioners, and inventors in the 
software industry argue that strong patent rights may hinder rather than 
encourage innovation in their field.4 Commentators point to areas of 
endeavor where innovation flourishes without intellectual property 
protection.5 And patent trolls, who reap benefits from the patent regime 
without contributing the social value the system is meant to encourage, 
have caused many to question our current approach.6 Perhaps in response 
to these concerns, the Supreme Court has accepted an increased number of 
recent patent cases, and has decided these cases in ways that generally 
narrow the scope and availability of patent rights.7 
                                                                                                                          
1 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (explaining the economic 
basis of the predominant incentive theory of intellectual property). 
2 See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of 
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989) (noting that an assumption of 
rationality exaggerates the actual cognitive capacities of humans).  
3 See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS xix–xx (2010) (arguing that humans act in predictably irrational ways in their economic 
reasoning and actions).  
4 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
198 (2011); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–6 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovati 
onrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6LH-TR5R] (arguing that patents suppress productive competition among 
firms). 
5 See, e.g., Aarthi S. Anand, “Less is More”: New Property Paradigm in the Information Age?, 
11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 65, 69 (2012) (discussing software development as an area where innovation 
has flourished without strong intellectual property protection); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual 
Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 447–48 (2013) 
(discussing intellectual property’s “negative-space”: areas of creation and innovation that thrive with 
little to no patent protection). 
6 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2172–80 (2013) (suggesting that trolls are a sign of a flawed patent system that warrants 
systemic reform). 
7 See Jeremy Elman, 6 Key Decisions: Patent Year in Review, FLA. BUS. REV. (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202679187906/6-Key-Decisions-Patent-Year-in-Review 
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Given the current distrust of patent rights, a renewed and 
comprehensive look at the various theoretical justifications for these rights 
is in order. Why do we grant patents? What do we hope to accomplish by 
doing so, and how?  
After discussing the standard theoretical answers to these questions, 
this Article critically evaluates each of the theories—including incentive, 
disclosure, prospect, commercialization, patent racing, and non-utilitarian 
theories—using a behavioral approach that arguably more accurately 
accounts for the realities of human action than previous analytical tools. 
Applying this approach, this Article examines whether our current patent 
system is the most effective system for meeting the stated goals of these 
theories.  
The behavioral framework used here offers insights into patent theories 
beyond what previously has been obtainable from traditional economic or 
rights-based analyses. For utilitarian theories, many of which invoke 
incentives to engage in innovation-optimizing behaviors (like invention, 
disclosure, and commercialization), the potential contribution of behavioral 
research is straightforward. Simply put, this work can help us understand 
whether individuals can be expected to respond to particular incentives in 
the way these theories propose. For non-utilitarian theories, many of which 
are focused on the rights of inventors, behavioral research can help us 
evaluate these theories in part by telling us whether our current system 
honors the interests implicated by the theories in a psychologically 
meaningful way. 
This is not the first Article that has sought to examine one or more 
patent theories, or that has incorporated behavioral insights into its 
analysis. But it is the first to comprehensively evaluate the major theories 
of patent protection using a behavioral framework. This Article adds to the 
growing literature that incorporates findings from psychology and 
sociology into analyses of intellectual property policy8—a developing 
trend that is consistent with similar movements in other areas of the law, 
and is based on the recognition that classical law and economics theory 
                                                                                                                          
(noting that the six patent cases on the Supreme Court’s 2014 docket represent the highest number of 
patent cases the Court has heard in one term).   
8 See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the 
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142 (2008); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2010); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 369, 374 (2011); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: 
Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2002 
(2011) [hereinafter Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process]; Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus 
Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 283, 286 (2010); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 813, 816. 
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does not capture the full complexity of human behavior.9 
From the perspective of this Article, the end goal of the behavioral 
analysis is a utilitarian one. Ultimately, many would agree that we want a 
patent system that will maximize social value at minimal social cost. This 
Article demonstrates that a behavioral analysis can help us achieve this 
system in two ways. First, it can tell us whether we actually can expect our 
current patent system to achieve the goals proposed by each of the various 
theories. Second, if the answer to the first question is no for a given theory, 
the analysis can give us clues as to how we might better achieve that 
particular goal. Although behavioral research cannot tell us what the goal 
of the patent system should be (that is a normative question the theories 
themselves attempt to answer), it can, in the two ways mentioned, help 
guide us towards the patent system we claim to want.   
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide an overview of 
the various utilitarian and non-utilitarian accounts of the patent system. 
Part III forms the bulk of the Article; in it I examine each of the 
justifications for patents in light of relevant behavioral research, including 
work that has not previously been discussed in the intellectual property 
context. Based on this analysis, I conclude that the patent system in its 
current form is best structured to incentivize commercialization—the goal 
proposed by commercialization theory. In contrast, according to this 
inquiry, many of the ends proposed by the other theories do not justify our 
current system. The analysis reveals, however, that many of these goals—
including promoting disclosure and productive competition—could be 
achieved by switching the focus of the patent system for early inventions 
from a primarily financial reward to a primarily attributional reward. In 
Part IV, I discuss the prescriptions that flow from my findings in the 
previous Parts. 
 II.  ACCOUNTS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM  
 Scholars have offered various justifications for the intellectual 
property system generally and the patent system in particular. The majority 
of commentators focus on utilitarian accounts that employ primarily 
economic arguments to explain why patents encourage optimal levels of 
                                                                                                                          
9 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23 (arguing generally that insights from psychology and 
sociology can be used to enrich classical law and economics analyses); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057–58 (2000) (describing the development of “law and behavioral science” 
theory, which borrows from psychological and sociocultural theories, as a response to the shortcomings 
of rational choice theory); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998) (reviewing 
the substantive fields in which legal scholars have applied insights from behavioral decision-making 
research).   
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innovation. Additionally, non-utilitarian defenses that seek to justify the 
patent system as a means of promoting goals and values beyond innovation 
have been proposed. In this Part, I provide a brief overview of the principal 
accounts. 
A.  Utilitarian Accounts 
1.  Incentive Theory 
The chief justification for the patent system is the so-called incentive 
theory. According to this theory, patents are necessary to efficiently 
incentivize the production of new ideas.10 This is so because ideas, unlike 
most physical property, are public goods: they are both non-rivalrous 
(meaning that they can be consumed simultaneously by more than one 
person) and non-excludable (meaning that one cannot effectively exclude 
others from their use).11 Thus, once an individual produces an invention, 
incurring invention costs and production costs in the process, others can 
copy it while incurring only the production costs.12 The result is that it is 
generally cheaper to copy someone else’s idea than it is to create your own 
idea from scratch.13  
Because the costs of copying are less than the costs of initial creation, 
copiers can sell their products at a lower cost than inventors, making it 
difficult for inventors to recoup the full costs of invention.14 Under this 
account, rational market players have every incentive to be copiers rather 
than inventors—to “free ride” on the larger expenditures and efforts of 
inventors.15  
According to incentive theory, patents overcome these market 
problems by granting limited-term monopolies to inventors.16 This allows 
                                                                                                                          
10 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) (explaining that without intellectual property protection, people 
would copy rather than create ideas). 
11 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
11 (3d ed. 2003) (“Information has the characteristics of what economists call a ‘public good’—it may  
be ‘consumed’ by many people without depletion, and it is difficult to identify those who will not pay 
and prevent them from using the information.”); Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (“The distinctive 
characteristic of most intellectual products . . . [is] that they are easily replicated and that enjoyment of 
them by one person does not prevent enjoyment of them by other persons.”); Johnson, supra note 8, at 
631–32 (explaining that ideas are “copyable goods” that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable). 
12 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that copyists incur only low costs of production 
when distributing products based on an inventor’s original idea).   
13 See Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 453 (“An underlying premise of the utilitarian approach is that 
copying costs less than initial creation.”).  
14 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that since copyists bear only the costs of 
production, they can offer products identical to the invention at very low prices).   
15 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 629 (explaining that the public can take a “free ride” on the labor 
of persons who create nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods). 
16 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that the patent system increases economic 
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inventors to recoup the full costs of invention by charging higher prices for 
their creations.17 It also provides market players with the necessary 
incentives to become inventors: because they can charge a premium for 
their goods, the payoff for inventors is potentially greater than that for 
copiers.18  
As Eric Johnson notes, the incentive theory may owe its popularity to 
the fact that it is logically appealing.19 It is also the account of intellectual 
property given in the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the 
power to “secur[e] for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries” for the purpose of 
“promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts.”20  
2.  Disclosure Theory 
In contrast to incentive theory, disclosure theory does not presume that 
patents are necessary to incentivize invention.21 Instead, this theory posits 
that inventors will solve the problems that arise from the non-rivalrous, 
non-excludable nature of ideas by maintaining secrecy over their 
inventions.22  
But secrecy brings its own potential economic problems. In particular, 
it might inhibit downstream innovation by those who would otherwise be 
expected to build on the discoveries of the secret-keeping inventor.23 
Secrecy could also, due to increased transaction costs, deter the 
economically beneficial practice of licensing.24  
According to disclosure theory, then, a patent provides an inventor not 
                                                                                                                          
efficiency by granting creators the exclusive right to copy).  
17 Id. 
18 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 31 (2011) (“[W]ithout an intellectual property regime that reserves for 
copyright owners any profits that can be gleaned from their work over an extensive time span, potential 
authors would lack adequate motivation to create in the first place . . . .”).  
19 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 634 (positing that the “irresistible logic” of incentive theory has 
caused it to be enshrined in the U.S. Constitution).  
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
21 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of 
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1038 (1998). 
22 Id. at 1039. An alternate conception of the theory envisions disclosure as a complement to 
incentive theory. Under this conception, the patent provides the primary incentive to innovate, but 
disclosure is an added benefit reaped by the public. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (arguing that patents benefit society economically because they reward 
inventors for both inventing and disclosing information to the public); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of 
the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“The benefit the public gets from the bargain, 
on [disclosure] theory, is not (or not just) a new invention but the publication of new learning that 
might otherwise have been kept secret.”).  
23 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1039 (elaborating on the notion that the inventor 
who keeps all relevant information secret cannot exploit all possible uses of the invention).  
24 See id. at 1039 (explaining that “secrecy in general is less effective as a means of appropriating 
returns from product invention.”).  
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with an incentive to invent, but with an incentive to disclose the invention 
once she has created it. This theory is sometimes framed as a contract the 
inventor enters into with society.25 In consideration for a patent, the 
inventor discloses her invention to the public.26     
Society reaps the benefits of this bargain with inventors in several 
ways. First, the public is free to use the information disclosed in the patent 
after the patent has expired, whereas if the patent had not issued, the 
information might have remained secret indefinitely.27 Second, the patent 
disclosure might spur innovation even during the life of the patent, as 
others attempt to design around the patent, improve on the disclosed 
invention, or are inspired by the disclosed information to create something 
new.28 Third, transaction costs of licensing are lowered because potential 
licensees are made aware of the existence of the invention, the parties in 
possession of the invention, and important details about precisely what the 
invention entails.29    
Disclosure theory is often endorsed by the courts as a justification for 
the patent system. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, reviewed a series of Supreme Court cases that characterized a 
patent as a “quid pro quo” given to the patentee in exchange for 
disclosure.30 She explained that “immediate disclosure . . . from[] the 
patentee . . . is the price paid for the exclusivity secured.”31 The Federal 
Circuit endorsed this theory in Enzo BioChem v. Gen-Probe when it 
explained that a patent’s written description requirement fulfills “the quid 
pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful 
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for 
a limited period of time.”32  
3.  Prospect Theory 
Incentive and disclosure theories focus on influencing behavior that 
occurs prior to invention. Prospect theory, in contrast, concerns itself with 
behavior that takes place after the initial inventive steps have been taken.33  
Edmund Kitch, the first proponent of the theory, compared a field of 
invention to a mining prospect.34 He argued that just as a mining claim is 
                                                                                                                          
25 E.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 745.  
26 Id.  
27 Fromer, supra note 22, at 548. 
28 Id. at 548–49. 
29 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1034 (arguing that patents reduce the transaction 
costs involved in licensing an invention).  
30 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003). 
31 Id.  
32 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
33 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 
(1977).  
34 Id. at 266. 
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given to a single firm for reasons of efficiency, so too should a broad 
patent be granted to an inventor to manage his invention and control 
further innovation within the field.35   
Prospect theory does not speak to the incentives that might be required 
to stimulate invention in the first place. It does, however, seek to provide 
the initial inventor with the incentive to efficiently use his invention and 
pursue additional innovation in the same field.36 The incentive is 
commensurate with the scope of the patent, which Kitch asserted should be 
broad.37   
Under prospect theory, exclusive rights to a broad field are given to the 
initial inventor for two reasons. First, the theory assumes that free 
development and exploitation of an invention once it has been created and 
disclosed, such as might take place if patent rights are defined narrowly, 
would lead to duplication and waste.38 This waste might show itself in the 
form of patent races where multiple parties compete to obtain a patent on 
an improvement of the original invention.39 Second, prospect theory 
assumes the initial inventor is in the best position to improve on the 
original invention.40  
Although prospect theory has been widely debated in the academic 
literature, it is not often cited by the courts or by Congress as a goal of the 
patent system. Elements of prospect theory have arisen in the copyright 
context, however, via the congressional call for longer copyright terms in 
the Copyright Term Extension Act.41 As argued by proponents, that 
legislation, enacted in 1998,42 provides incentives to copyright owners to 
continue preserving, producing, and distributing their previous creations.43 
4.  Commercialization Theory 
Like prospect theory, commercialization theory also addresses 
behavior that occurs after an invention has been conceived.44 But unlike 
                                                                                                                          
35 Id. at 271–75.  
36 Lemley, supra note 22, at 738–39.  
37 Kitch, supra note 33, at 267.  
38 Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1042. 
39 Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 307–
08 (1992) (discussing the patent system’s compromise of granting protection broad enough to serve the 
system’s purposes, but not so broad as to encourage wasteful patent races); see also Kitch, supra note 
33, at 269–71.  
40 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1042 (describing prospect theory’s assumption that 
a broad patent promotes development in a structured manner). But see Lemley, supra note 22, at 740–
41 (questioning this assumption). 
41 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 222 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension 
Act); Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
42 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35; Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
43 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
44 Lemley, supra note 22, at 738–39.  
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prospect theory, which focuses on eliminating socially wasteful patent 
races, commercialization theory focuses on the patent as an incentive for 
inventors to develop their ideas and, ultimately, bring them to market.45  
As Ted Sichelman explains, commercialization theory recognizes that 
“conception is more of a process than an event,” and a number of steps 
beyond the initial idea are generally required before a creation is ready for 
public consumption.46 Because the economic benefits flowing from 
innovation largely depend on inventions reaching the public in usable 
form,47 the theory focuses on the patent system as a means of providing 
adequate incentives for each of these essential steps.48  
According to this theory’s proponents, the patent system has the 
potential to facilitate commercialization in several ways. First, adequate 
patent incentives can encourage the original inventor to do what is 
necessary to bring the creation to market and reap the rewards of the patent 
monopoly.49 If the original inventor does not have the resources to perform 
the post-inventive development activities required to bring a product to 
market, a patent may also facilitate transferring the invention to a larger or 
more specialized firm for commercialization.50 If the inventor does decide 
to single-handedly undertake commercialization, a patent may facilitate the 
patentee’s search for development and commercialization funding.51 While 
some commercialization proponents focus on justifying the current patent 
system via a commercialization account, others have suggested reforms 
that would more effectively advance commercialization’s goals, including 
a new, commercialization-focused patent.52   
Commercialization has recently been cited by the Federal Circuit as a 
                                                                                                                          
45 Michael Abramowicz, The Dangers of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1065, 1073–76 (2007); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–53 
(2010).   
46 Sichelman, supra note 45, at 349–52 (noting that these steps might include making a prototype, 
market testing, marketing, and distribution). 
47 Id. at 377–78. 
48 See id. at 350–54 (describing the phases of work typically required to make commercial use of 
a patent).  
49 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–08 (2001). 
50 Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1040. 
51 See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 227, 241–43 (2012) (noting how two goals of the patent system articulated in commercialization 
theory—(1) facilitating transfer of an invention and (2) fundraising for commercialization purposes—
are a solution to the “disclosure paradox”—the reticence of inventors to reveal important information to 
parties capable of helping to commercialize it for fear of having their ideas stolen); see also Arti Kaur 
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 77, 121–22 (1999). This Article focuses exclusively on the financial incentive strain, rather 
than the disclosure paradox strains, of commercialization theory. 
52 Compare Kieff, supra note 49, at 707–08 (justifying the current system in terms of 
commercialization), with Sichelman, supra note 45, at 400–09 (proposing a separate commercialization 
patent for those who commit to developing and selling a product). 
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goal of the patent system. In Fresenius USA v. Baxter International, the 
court stated that “[t]he system of patents is founded on providing an 
incentive for the creation, development, and commercialization of new 
technology.”53  
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allows universities to obtain 
patents on the fruits of publicly funded research, also reflects 
commercialization concerns.54 Section 200 of the Act states that “[i]t is the 
policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote 
the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development . . . [and] the commercialization and public availability of 
inventions made in the United States by United States industry and 
labor.”55  
5.  Patent Racing Theory 
Under prospect theory, patent races are viewed as an inefficient 
outcome remedied by granting an initial inventor control over 
improvements and subsequent innovations in the field.56 In contrast, Mark 
Lemley argues that patent races may perform an important function, and 
that a patent’s role in encouraging these races provides an independent 
theoretical justification for the patent system.57   
According to this theory, inventors do not necessarily need the 
incentive of the patent to invent in the first instance.58 The fact that a patent 
is available, however, will tend to speed the pace of innovation as 
individuals and groups literally race for the patent prize.59 Inventors may 
engage in these races because they want the monopoly reward a patent 
brings or because they fear being excluded from or taxed for the use of 
their own inventions if someone else patents them.60     
Although the traditional interpretation is that patent racing is 
economically wasteful, Lemley argues that this view may be overstated.61 
A race to obtain a patent for a given invention will necessarily involve 
some duplication of effort, but because innovation is a trial-and-error 
process, independent groups working towards the same goal will likely 
adopt different approaches.62 These differences in approach may lead to 
                                                                                                                          
53 Fresenius USA v. Baxter Int’l, 733 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
54 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); see 
also Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1041. 
55 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 § 200 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012)). 
56 Grady & Alexander, supra note 39, at 307; see also Kitch, supra note 33, at 269–70.  
57 Lemley, supra note 22, at 750–51, 757. 
58 Id. at 736–37. 
59 Id. at 752–53. 
60 Id. at 755–56.  
61 Id. at 752–53.  
62 Id. at 753–54.  
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additional insights and contributions, useful in particular circumstances or 
for solving different iterations of the same problem.63 Any waste from 
duplicative efforts is therefore, under this theory, more than made up for by 
gains in the pace of innovation and the added contributions by multiple 
parties working on a given problem.64   
B.  Non-Utilitarian Accounts 
1.  Labor-Desert Theory 
The labor-desert theory of intellectual property is the prominent non-
utilitarian justification for patents. It stems from Locke’s writings on 
common property.65 Locke proposed that an individual who works to 
improve common property is entitled, via notions of natural law, to rights 
in this property.66  
In the intellectual property context, labor-desert proponents argue that 
the same holds true for the “common property” of ideas.67 When someone 
takes an idea and improves upon it to create an invention, natural rights 
notions dictate a grant of rights in recognition of these efforts.68  
Locke moderated his theory of earned property rights by two 
“provisos.” First, he argued that property rights should be granted only if 
there remains “enough and as good” in the commons for others to use.69 
Second, he argued that “property should not be wasted.”70 A common 
interpretation of Locke’s provisos in the intellectual property context holds 
that granting intellectual property rights to one person should not cause a 
net harm to others.71  
A system that grants exclusive, albeit temporally limited, rights has the 
potential to cause harm by removing ideas and inventions from the 
commons.72 Labor-desert theory in the intellectual property context thus 
seeks to achieve a balance between granting individual rights and 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 444–46.  
66 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285–86 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690).  
67 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32–33 (2011).  
68 Id. 
69 Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 146–47 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).  
70 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297–98 (1988); 
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455.  
71 Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 78–79 
(1997); see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455.  
72 See Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 456.  
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preventing harm to the larger society.73  
The labor-desert rationale of intellectual property is rarely cited 
explicitly by the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit in patent cases. But 
a number of scholars have argued that natural rights concerns nevertheless 
strongly inform judicial and congressional attitudes towards intellectual 
property.74     
2.  Personality Theory 
Personality theory shares many similarities with the labor-desert 
account; the two accounts are often referred to together as “moral rights” 
justifications.75 Derived from the writings of Hegel, personality theory 
holds that a creator is entitled to rights in his invention, not only because 
justice dictates a reward for his labor, but because he has a personality 
interest in his discovery.76 The theory conceives of creations as extensions 
of their creators; a creator thus has an ongoing interest in the fate of his 
creation just as a parent has an ongoing interest in the fate of his child.77   
Monetary reward plays a less central role in personality theory than in 
other theories.78 Because the theory is primarily concerned with validating 
the personhood of creators through their works, its aims may be achieved 
in a variety of ways that do not necessarily involve payment; for example, 
by ensuring that a creator receives credit for her work or by giving her 
ongoing control over how her work is used.79  
Under the logic of personality theory, works that implicate a greater 
personhood interest should be entitled to greater protections, and vice 
versa.80 Employing this logic, Justin Hughes has argued that artistic works, 
                                                                                                                          
73 Id.  
74 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 151–56 (1992) (arguing that Lockean fairness concerns 
have motivated the grant of ownership rights to an expanding range of “beneficial products of human 
effort”); Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 351 
(2009) (arguing that natural rights notions were used to justify the creation of new areas of intellectual 
property law, including trade secrets and trademarks); Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in 
Intellectual Property Law? The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 65 (“While 
sweat-of-the-brow considerations have almost disappeared from the courts’ jurisprudence, the labor-
desert theory as such continues to influence attitudes toward intellectual property law.”); Deborah 
Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 226 (1998) (arguing that the recent expansion of property rights in intangibles 
has been fueled by natural rights notions).  
75 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1753 
(2012).  
76 Id.; Hughes, supra note 70, at 330, 333; see also Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 (1982) (arguing that the development of personality through the 
embodiment of one’s will should form the basis of abstract and formal rights).      
77 See Radin, supra note 76, at 965–68.  
78 Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 457.  
         79 Id.; Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790; see also Radin, supra note 76, at 968. 
         80 See Hughes, supra note 70, at 339–40.  
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including “[p]oems, stories, novels, . . . musical works[,] . . . sculpture, 
paintings, and prints” are more likely candidates for legal protection than 
the works of the “genetic researcher or the aerospace engineer.”81    
Unlike utilitarian (and to a lesser extent, labor-desert) theories, 
personality theory does not figure prominently in U.S. patent law.82 
Hughes contrasts this with Europe, where in France and Germany, patent 
owners are given the explicit moral right to receive attribution for their 
works.83   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with Hughes’s arguments, to the 
extent that personality theory has proven influential in the United States, it 
has been in the context of expressive works of the kind commonly 
protected by copyright law.84 For example, commentators have pointed to 
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which grants certain personality 
rights to the creators of small distributions of visual art, including the right 
to attribution.85 
3.  Social Planning Theory 
The final theory discussed here shares with utilitarian approaches an 
instrumentalist emphasis.86 Unlike utilitarian accounts of patents, however, 
which focus narrowly on maximizing economic welfare by promoting 
innovation, social planning theory aims more broadly to promote a “just 
and attractive culture” through the intellectual property system.87   
Because the goals of social planning theory are broader and less well-
defined than those of utilitarian approaches, scholarship in this area has 
been devoted to the threshold task of articulating what, exactly, constitutes 
a “just and attractive culture.” Madhavi Sunder, who has advocated an 
approach to intellectual property that would “emphasiz[e] multiple values 
beyond just efficiency,” has listed as desirable values autonomy, culture, 
democracy, equality, and development.88 William Fisher has argued that 
the intellectual property system should promote a number of precise goals, 
including creativity, community, happiness, respect, and opportunities for 
meaningful work and self-determination.89     
                                                                                                                          
81 Id. at 340, 342–43.  
82 But see Fromer, supra note 75, at 1792 (arguing that the attribution requirement in U.S. patent 
law “ever so faintly” protects creators’ property interests).  
83 Hughes, supra note 70, at 350.  
84 Fisher, supra note 1, at 174. 
85 Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 603, § 106A (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994)); Fisher, supra 
note 1, at 174; Fromer, supra note 75, at 1796. 
         86  Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 457–58.  
87 William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1747–49 
(1988); see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 171 (stating that one justification for intellectual property 
rights may be the creation of social and economic conditions conducive to human flourishing).  
88 Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 324–25 (2006).  
89 Fisher, supra note 87, at 1747–48; see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 171. Many of the values 
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Social planning theorists have also discussed how current intellectual 
property doctrines fit with their identified goals and how the system could 
be tailored to better promote these goals. As with other non-utilitarian 
approaches, much of this work focuses on copyright and other non-patent 
intellectual property rights, like publicity.90 To the extent that courts and 
legislators explicitly or implicitly rely on the social planning theory of 
intellectual property, it also tends to be outside the patent context.91  
III.  USING A BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK  
TO EVALUATE PATENT THEORIES 
Of the various accounts that have been given to justify intellectual 
property, far and away the most influential of these is the utilitarian 
incentive story.92 The predominance of the incentive story may explain in 
part why many recent efforts to integrate insights from psychology and 
sociology into intellectual property scholarship have focused almost 
exclusively on this theory.93  
But a behavioral framework can play a much larger role in patent 
scholarship and policy analysis. Specifically, this framework can enable us 
to determine whether any of the theoretical accounts of the patent system 
align with real-world behaviors. If it appears from this analysis that theory 
and reality are not aligned, the behavioral literature can further contribute 
by giving us insights into the types of programs and incentives that have 
the best chance of achieving the goals we want our patent system to 
accomplish.  
In this Part, I initiate that analysis by evaluating the implications of 
relevant behavioral research for each of the above-described accounts of 
the patent system. But first, I begin with a brief introduction to the use of 
                                                                                                                          
articulated by commentators working in the social planning theory vein share similarities with, or 
explicitly draw from, the capability approach to welfare economics, first articulated by Amartya Sen 
and most notably elaborated upon in the development context by Martha Nussbaum. See, e.g., Sunder, 
supra note 88, at 313–14.    
90 Fisher, for example, has argued that the fair use copyright doctrine could be reworked such that 
uses promoting his vision of an attractive culture would be deemed “fair,” while those that detracted 
from this vision would not. Fisher, supra note 87, at 1766–67, 1780. Neil Netanel has argued that a 
shorter copyright term would help promote creativity by placing more materials in the public domain 
for others to build on. Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
3668–71 (1996). One exception to this trend is Sunder’s work, which has evaluated developments in 
international patent law through the lens of distributive justice. Sunder, supra note 88, at 290–91.  
91 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 175 (describing courts’ unwillingness to uphold assertions of 
copyright against criticism and commentary as an example of social planning theory in action).  
92 Fisher, supra note 1, at 173–74; Johnson, supra note 8, at 626–27; Lemley, supra note 10, at 
129–30; see also supra Part II.A.1.   
93 See infra Part III.B.1. As I also discuss in this Part, another obvious reason for this focus on the 
incentive theory is the fact that a key finding from the psychology research calls into question the 
premise of the incentive theory: that external incentives are required to encourage creativity. 
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behavioral research generally to inform utilitarian and other modes of legal 
inquiry. 
A.  Using Behavioral Research to Inform Legal Analyses 
Beginning in the 1960s and through the 1970s, the law and economics 
approach grew to become one of the dominant strains of legal analysis.94 
The approach focuses on the efficiency of legal rules and incentives.95 It 
assumes that an actor being governed by the legal system is rational and 
will respond in ways that maximize his own personal utility.96  
The premise of the rational actor, however, has long been suspect.97 In 
particular, commentators have questioned whether cognitive biases could 
influence behavior and cause an individual to act less than rationally even 
when he has access to perfect information.98 During the initial growth of 
the law and economics movement, however, there were few attempts by 
either legal theorists or psychologists to elucidate legal issues with 
psychological findings.99  
This slowly began to change during the late 1980s and through the 
1990s and 2000s as an increasing number of legal scholars started to draw 
important connections between the work of experimental psychologists and 
the basic assumptions made in law and economics models.100 As this “law 
and behavioral science” approach gained momentum, scholars began 
applying insights from the psychology literature to a range of substantive 
fields of law. In 1998, a review of the literature showed that behavioral 
decision-making research had been applied by commentators to questions 
of contract, tort, criminal, tax, corporate, property, and family law, among 
other areas.101 
Today, it is an increasingly well-accepted premise that findings from 
                                                                                                                          
94 See Paul H. Rubin, Law and Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 322–
23 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
95 Id. 
96 Id.; Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23.  
97 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23.  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 24. 
100 See, e.g., id. at 35, 40–43 (discussing several experimental findings that call into question the 
rational-actor model, including the concept of framing, wherein an actor’s weighing of risk and reward 
depends on his reference frame; limitations on cognitive capacity that affect an actor’s ability to 
process information; the decreased ability of an actor to process dissonant information; and limitations 
on self-control that affect an actor’s ability to act rationally even when he knows this is the “right” 
choice); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1075–76, 1113–17, 1127–30, 1135–36 (discussing 
additional experimental findings that call into question the rational-actor model, including the use of 
heuristics or shortcuts in decision-making; the role of habits, addictions, and cravings in decision-
making; and the finding that actors for various reasons, including compliance with social norms and 
conceptions of fairness, do not always act in their own self-interest).  
101 Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1502, 1511–12, 1514–15, 1517. 
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the behavioral science literature can contribute important insights to a 
range of substantive fields and analytic paradigms.102 For whatever reason, 
however, behavioral research has been relatively slow to find its way into 
analyses of intellectual property entitlements, which have been, and 
continue to be, in a predominantly classical economic strain.103 
This is beginning to change, however, as a growing number of 
intellectual property scholars publish scholarship examining the 
implications of behavioral science for intellectual property.104 Many of 
these works explore the implications of the behavioral science research for 
the dominant utilitarian incentive account of intellectual property.105 The 
rest of this Part briefly reviews what has been done in this respect and goes 
on to generalize a behavioral framework for evaluating the other major 
accounts of the patent system.   
B.  Psychology and Utilitarian Accounts of the Patent System 
In general, utilitarian justifications for patents posit that economic 
incentives will encourage actors to behave in various innovation-
optimizing ways. Behavioral findings can help us understand whether 
individuals will respond to these incentives as predicted. 
1.  Incentive Theory 
The incentive justification for patents holds that a patent is needed to 
overcome the free-rider problem and encourage potential inventors to 
engage in innovative activities they would not undertake without the 
incentive. A number of intellectual property scholars have pointed to a key 
finding from the psychology literature that calls the basic premise of the 
incentive account into question.106 
a.  Motivation Research 
The key finding is this: individuals, in general, undertake creative 
                                                                                                                          
102 This increased acceptance is exemplified by the recent growth of behavioral economics, where 
findings from behavioral decision-making research are explicitly integrated into economic legal 
analyses. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8, 97–99 (2008). 
103 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169.  
104 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1753; sources cited supra note 8. 
105 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 8, at 373 (arguing that the incentive theory of intellectual 
property law should be modified in light of social norms); Johnson, supra note 8, at 678–79 
(concluding that patent entitlements should be sunsetted in light of behavioral research that calls the 
incentive theory into question); Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 1999–2000 
(arguing that psychological research offers insight into the incentive theory of intellectual property); 
Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 816–17 (arguing that a “socio-historical approach” can contribute 
important insights to the “primary goal of patent law . . . to incentivize innovation”). 
106 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 640–41; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, 
at 2007–12; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 47–49. 
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activities not for a monetary reward, but because they are intrinsically 
motivated to do so—because they wish to “engag[e] in [the] activity for its 
own sake, out of interest, or for the pleasure and satisfaction derived from 
the experience.”107 In contrast, extrinsic motivators like money, which 
align more closely with the utilitarian rational-actor model of decision-
making,108 actually may detract from creative behavior.109 Since a patent 
may function as an extrinsic motivator, commentators have noted that this 
finding has implications for the incentive theory of patents.110  
The commentators differ somewhat in their determinations of what 
these implications are. Eric Johnson argues that the current system of 
patent entitlements could be “phased out entirely.”111 He points to 
restrictions on competition and other losses that accrue from the patent 
system.112 Since it appears from the motivation research that patents may 
not be required to incentivize creativity, Johnson proposes that patent 
rights be granted only in limited situations and only on a showing that they 
are needed to incentivize creation or for some other reason.113 
On the other hand, Gregory Mandel asserts that our current patent 
system is not necessarily inconsistent with the motivation research.114 The 
research suggests, for example, that framing a given activity as achieving 
either intrinsic or extrinsic goals can influence the motivation of the 
individual engaging in the activity.115 If the activity is framed as achieving 
intrinsic goals, intrinsic motivation and attendant creativity are enhanced, 
                                                                                                                          
107 Hsiu-Fen Lin, Effects of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation on Employee Knowledge Sharing 
Intentions, 33 J. INFO. SCI. 135, 137 (2007).  
108 Id. 
109 TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 92–93 (1996); see also Mandel, To Promote 
the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2007–08. But see Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental 
Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1938–39 (2014) 
(discussing behavioral findings suggesting that extrinsic motivators may not undermine creativity in all 
contexts; for example, when individuals are given instructions about how to perform creatively to 
achieve a reward, or when the reward is performance-contingent rather than completion-contingent).    
110 E.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 624–26; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 
8, at 2010–11. Cohen and Zimmerman have made the same observation in the context of the copyright 
system. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research 
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 47–48. 
111 Johnson, supra note 8, at 675–76.  
112 Id. at 671, 677.  
113 Id. at 675–76. In the copyright context, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman suggests a number of 
implications for the copyright system arising from the intrinsic motivation research. See Zimmerman, 
supra note 18, at 30. Although she does not suggest that copyright entitlements should be eliminated 
altogether, she does argue for an end to copyright term extensions, the creation of additional statutory 
exemptions to copyright, and a more liberal construal by courts of noninfringing uses. Id. at 54–57. 
114 See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012 (arguing that patent law’s 
nonobviousness requirement may enhance intrinsic motivation and promote creative achievement).  
115 Maarten Vansteenkiste et al., Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Goal Contents in Self-Determination 
Theory: Another Look at the Quality of Academic Motivation, 41 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 19, 24–25 
(2006).  
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and vice versa.116 According to Mandel, to the extent the nonobviousness 
requirement for patents frames the inventive process as achieving the 
intrinsic goal of creativity, this doctrine may enhance rather than detract 
from creative behavior.117   
Further, recent empirical work by Christopher Buccafusco and 
colleagues suggests that when extrinsic incentives are probabilistic and 
threshold-based—as patent rights are—rather than directly based on 
performance—as are many of the incentives examined in the social science 
literature—these incentives may not undermine, and may in fact 
encourage, creativity.118 Based on this finding, and similarly to Mandel, the 
authors of this empirical study suggest that the high nonobvious threshold 
for patent protection might be beneficial for motivation and creativity.119     
Despite the disagreement over the best response to findings from the 
motivation research, it is clear that these findings present a more 
complicated picture than the economic incentive theory acknowledges. 
Further attention to this issue is thus justified. Incentive theory could be 
refined in order to fully account for the behavioral research.120 
Alternatively, the theory might lose its position as the dominant account of 
the patent system as commentators turn to other justifications for patent 
entitlements that are more in keeping with behavioral research.121  
b.  Other Findings 
Intellectual property scholars working in a behavioral science vein 
have pointed to a number of other insights from the empirical literature and 
analyzed these within the framework of incentive theory. These insights 
include the discovery that collaborative, cross-disciplinary work can 
enhance creativity;122 the finding that creative output generally requires 
both problem-finding and problem-solving skills and a mix of convergent 
                                                                                                                          
116 Id.  
117 Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012.  
118 Buccafusco et al., supra note 109, at 1977.  
119 Id. at 1978. 
120 An example of such a refinement is Mandel’s suggestion that the nonobviousness requirement 
be maintained or strengthened to assure that the patent “frames” invention as an intrinsic goal for 
inventors. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012; Gregory Mandel, The Non-
Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent 
Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 90 (2008).      
121 As stated in Part I, one of the goals of this Article is to initiate an inquiry into the consistency 
of the various patent justifications with behavioral research. One of the main concerns of scholars who 
have pointed to the connection between the motivation research and the incentive theory of intellectual 
property is that the continued dominance of incentive theory may perpetuate rent-seeking behavior by 
actors who do not require a patent as an incentive, but who nevertheless want to reap the rewards a 
patent offers. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 665; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 55.    
122 Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2013–16; see also Pedraza-Fariña, 
supra note 8, at 838–40.  
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(analytic) and divergent (intuitive) thinking;123 the understanding that the 
creative process progresses in stages;124 and the idea that vested interests or 
prevailing social norms can either hinder or encourage innovation.125  
As these scholars have pointed out, these additional findings have 
implications for and within the incentive account of the patent system.126 
But unlike the discovery that individuals may not need external incentives 
to achieve optimal levels of creativity, these insights do not necessarily 
speak to the fundamental correctness or viability of incentive theory.127 To 
the extent that these findings have more fundamental implications for 
alternate accounts of the patent system, I will discuss them below.  
2.  Disclosure Theory 
Disclosure theory, a second utilitarian justification for patents that has 
seen some popularity with courts, holds that a patent incentive is necessary 
to prevent an inventor from keeping her invention secret.128 But behavioral 
research suggests that this theory may not be grounded in the reality of 
human behavior. 
a.  Motivation Research 
     i.  Disclosure and Reward 
Just as incentive theory has been called into question by the suggestion 
that individuals may not need external motivators to encourage creative 
activity, it is also possible that individuals need no external motivators to 
encourage them to share their creative fruits with others. Indeed, following 
the logic of the creativity motivation research, which has shown that 
individuals are intrinsically motivated to create in part out of a desire to 
contribute and “give back” to society,129 one might expect this to be the 
case.130    
This intuition is borne out by empirical studies. Researchers have 
                                                                                                                          
123 Fromer, supra note 8, at 1468–72; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 
2002, 2004–05, 2007. 
124 Fromer, supra note 8, at 1462.  
125 Id. at 1474; Hubbard, supra note 8, at 376–78; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 844–45. 
126 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 8, at 1443–44 (“If the goal of patent and copyright law is to 
provide an incentive to produce creative works, it is worth looking to the psychological literature that 
illuminates the process by which scientists and artists actually create and by which individuals 
appreciate creative works.”). 
127 In contrast, and as explained in Part III.B.1, supra, the motivation research potentially presents 
a fatal challenge to incentive theory. 
128 See supra Part II.A.2.  
129 See Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 44.   
130 The idea that individuals may be willing to share their creative outputs for something other 
than a monetary reward has also been suggested by others. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790, 
1797 (arguing that attribution can serve as a more powerful incentive than money in many cases); 
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 465 (same).   
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found that intrinsic motivation plays a significant role in a person’s desire 
to share knowledge and discoveries with others.131 In particular, intrinsic 
factors like knowledge self-efficacy (a person’s sense that he has valuable 
information to share) and enjoyment in helping others predict a person’s 
willingness to share knowledge.132 In contrast, external rewards seem to 
have little effect on a person’s willingness to share knowledge.133  
The behavioral research, then, suggests that disclosure theory’s 
premise—that an external reward is required to encourage inventors to 
disclose information that they would otherwise keep secret—may not be 
correct.   
A potential caveat of this conclusion is one that has also been 
identified for motivation research’s challenge to incentive theory: although 
individuals may indeed be internally motivated to create (or, in this case, 
disclose their creations), the majority of patentable innovation (and 
subsequent disclosure) is accomplished by individuals who are working 
not independently, but within organizations.134 Unlike individuals, 
organizations may be more likely to behave like rational actors, 
undertaking cost-benefit analyses and subject to utilitarian incentives.135 So 
where an individual might disclose an invention for purely intrinsic 
reasons, a firm might keep the same invention secret absent an extrinsic 
award that tips the cost-benefit scale in favor of disclosure.136  
                                                                                                                          
131 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 107, at 135, 137.    
132 E.g., Lin, supra note 107, at 137; Wole Olatokun & Chinazom Irene Nwafor, The Effect of 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation on Knowledge Sharing Intentions of Civil Servants in Ebonyi State, 
Nigeria, 28 INFO. DEV. 216 (2012); Gee-Woo Bock & Young-Gul Kim, Breaking the Myths of 
Rewards: An Exploratory Study of Attitudes About Knowledge Sharing (PACIS 2001 Proceedings, 
Paper No. 78, 2001). 
133 Bock & Kim, supra note 132; Lin, supra note 107, at 143, 145; Olatokun & Nwafor, supra 
note 132. One exception to this conclusion, as I will discuss later in this Article, is the finding that the 
extrinsic reward of enhanced personal reputation can motivate knowledge sharing. See, e.g., Molly 
McLure Wasko & Samer Faraj, Why Should I Share? Examining Social Capital and Knowledge 
Contribution in Electronic Networks of Practice, 29 MIS Q. 35, 53 (2005).     
134 According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, only approximately fourteen percent of all 
patented inventions originate from independent inventors. Compare Patent Counts by Class by Year—
Independent Inventors, January 1977–December 2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby_in.htm [http://perma.cc/E6VJ-GU4K] (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing 1,225,614 utility patents that were unassigned or assigned to an 
individual rather than an organization), with Patent Counts by Class by Year, January 1977–December 
2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm 
[http://perma.cc/WZ74-FEQE] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing a total of 9,020,440 utility patents in 
the same time period). 
135 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 661 (stating that corporations, generally speaking, may proceed 
in a more calculated, practical manner than most individuals with respect to the production of 
intellectual property). 
136 The difference between individuals and organizations in their willingness to disclose 
information is hinted at by the fact that many firms require their employees to sign non-disclosure 
agreements. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
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A response to this caveat is the same as that provided for incentive 
theory’s parallel concern.137 Empirical studies suggest that many firms, in 
their innovative decision-making, simply do not take the prospect of a 
patent reward into account.138 In fact, a surprising number of firms view 
patents as an ineffective way to make profits and recoup research and 
development costs.139 If an organization is not motivated by a patent to 
innovate in the first place because it does not consider the patent an 
effective way to achieve a return on investment, it is unlikely that the same 
firm will be motivated by the patent to disclose information that it 
otherwise sees fit to keep to itself.140  
This response is by no means complete. For one thing, the studies cited 
do not suggest that firms, like people, are intrinsically motivated to 
disclose their inventions; instead, they indicate only that a patent might not 
be the most effective way to encourage this disclosure. Further attention to 
how intrinsic motivation and other sociological and psychological factors 
influencing disclosure behavior play out in the various settings where 
patentable innovation actually takes place is thus warranted. But at the very 
least, the fact that a patent reward likely will do little to encourage 
disclosure at the individual level suggests that disclosure theory may not 
align with real-world behavior.  
ii.  Disclosure and Attribution 
Behavioral research suggests that the classic extrinsic motivator—
money—does not influence an individual’s willingness to share 
knowledge.141 Interestingly, though, this same work suggests that a 
different kind of reward, though still technically extrinsic in the sense that 
it is externally administered, does have the power to motivate disclosure 
behavior. This reward is attribution, with its concomitant benefits of 
reputation enhancement and feedback.   
                                                                                                                          
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 517, 525–26 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 
2009).   
137 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 661.  
138 Id. at 661–63 (citing MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 62 (2008)).  
139 Id. One major exception to this is the pharmaceutical industry, where industry players report 
that patents play a major role in innovative behavior. A report cited by Johnson concludes that sixty-
five percent of pharmaceutical innovations would not have made it to market without a patent 
incentive. Id. at 663 (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. 
SCI. 173, 175 (1986)).  
140 For example, Boldrin and Levine’s report indicates that for new processes in particular, 
innovators prefer secrecy to a patent monopoly. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 138, at 62.  
141 Lin, supra note 107, at 143, 145; Olatokun & Nwafor, supra note 132; Bock & Kim, supra 
note 132. 
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In the context of online communities,142 for example, individuals 
choose to share their knowledge with others instead of free riding in part 
because they believe it will enhance their personal and professional 
reputations.143 Similarly, in a controlled knowledge-sharing laboratory 
experiment, a reputation feedback reward was the most significant 
predictor of an individual’s willingness to disclose.144 This was in contrast 
to other extrinsic motivators, including economic rewards and reciprocity, 
which the study concluded had little effect on a participant’s willingness to 
share knowledge.145  
These findings are notable because the classic understanding in the 
motivation community is that intrinsic motivators of a given action tend to 
promote that action and enhance its outcome, while extrinsic motivators 
tend to be outcome-neutral or outcome-detrimental.146 The findings are 
potentially consistent, however, with Edward Deci and Richard Ryan’s 
explanation that “there are varied types of extrinsic motivation, some of 
which do, indeed, represent impoverished forms of motivation and some of 
which represent active, agentic states.”147 In particular, extrinsically 
motivated behaviors that increase an individual’s feelings of competence 
and autonomy can, like intrinsically motivated behaviors, result in 
enhanced performance outcomes.148 Positive performance feedback has 
also been shown directly to enhance intrinsic motivation.149 Attribution, 
therefore, though an extrinsic reward, is perhaps a powerful motivator of 
knowledge sharing because of the promise of enhanced feelings of 
competency (through enhanced reputation and positive feedback) that it 
offers.   
Consistent with these findings, several commentators have argued that 
attribution is a key component of a successful intellectual property system 
that, in at least some cases, might be more important than economic 
reward. Michael Burstein and others suggest that attribution encourages 
                                                                                                                          
142 Online communities are referred to as “electronic networks of practice” by the authors. Wasko 
& Faraj, supra note 133, at 35.  
143 Id. at 49–50.  
144 Shin-Yuan Hung et al., The Influence of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation on Individuals’ 
Knowledge Sharing Behavior, 69 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 415, 422–23 (2011).  
145 Id. at 422–24. Consistent with the research described earlier in this Article, Hung et al. found 
that the intrinsic motivator of altruism was positively related to willingness to disclose, though the 
relationship was not as strong as that between willingness to disclose and reputation feedback. Id. at 
424–25.     
146 See, e.g., Richard M. Ryan & Jennifer G. LaGuardia, Achievement Motivation Within a 
Pleasured Society: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations to Learn and the Politics of School Reform, in 
11 ADVANCES IN MOTIVATION AND ACHIEVEMENT 45, 50, 54, 55 (Timothy C. Urdan ed., 1999). 
147 Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions 
and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 55 (2000).  
148 Id. at 58 (citing R. CHRISTOPHER DECHARMS, PERSONAL CAUSATION (1968)). 
149 Id. at 59 (citing Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971)). 
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disclosure in the academic context.150 Jeanne Fromer argues that in 
addition to the financial advantages that flow from attribution through 
reputational effects, attribution can also act as an “expressive incentive” 
that encourages creation.151 And based on an analysis of the factors that 
influence the success of intellectual property’s negative spaces, Elizabeth 
Rosenblatt proposes attribution as an alternative to exclusivity.152 The 
analysis of the psychology literature presented here provides additional 
support for these proposals. 
b.  Disclosure Social Norms 
Actors the patent system seeks to govern are influenced not only by 
individual psychological factors, but also by social norms.153 Just as 
psychological motivations might make the patent, and the incentive to 
disclose it provides, unnecessary in certain instances, social norms in 
certain contexts might encourage information sharing even in the absence 
of a patent.154  
One context where this appears to be true is the university research 
setting. Intellectual property scholars have noted the prevalence of 
knowledge-sharing norms in the academic science community.155 Robert 
Merton, for example, describes the norm of “scientific communism” in 
academia, where scientific researchers share a “common heritage” of 
collaboration that arises from both the community’s goal of advancing 
knowledge and individual researchers’ desires for recognition and 
esteem.156     
Although disclosure theory suggests that patent rights might enhance 
these knowledge-sharing norms by providing increased incentives for 
disclosure, Eisenberg and others have voiced concern that the opposite in 
fact might be true.157 In particular, the prospect of a patent might delay 
knowledge sharing by academics who are concerned about meeting the 
                                                                                                                          
150 Burstein, supra note 51, at 269–70.  
151 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790–91. The distinction Fromer draws between the “pecuniary” and 
“expressive” incentives offered by an attribution right are very similar to the “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” 
motivational components of attribution revealed in the psychology literature.  
152 Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 478–79.  
153 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 373; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 815–16.  
154 Although this might not always be the case, social norms in many situations might result 
directly or indirectly from psychological factors. See, e.g., infra note 156.  
155 E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 
1046–48 (1989); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79–80 (1999); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-
Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289 (2003). 
156 Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 1046–47 (quoting ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENCE 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973)). Note that according to Merton and Eisenberg’s accounts, 
the norm of scientific communism appears to arise at least in part from scientists’ desires for reputation 
enhancement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this suggests that psychological factors may drive social norms.  
157 E.g., Rai, supra note 155, at 109–15; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 291.    
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requirements imposed by the patent system;158 additionally, confidentiality 
requirements imposed by firms in academic-industry collaborations might 
impede disclosure.159  
Empirical studies confirm that patents have indeed undermined the 
knowledge sharing that flows from social norms in the academic 
community.160 In a study examining data-sharing behavior among 
university scientists, Jeremy Grushcow found that patent-seekers were less 
likely than non-patent-seekers to share early research results.161 Patent-
seekers also delayed formal publication as compared to non-patent-
seekers.162 In one study, academic scientists involved in an academic-
industry collaboration were more likely than their non-collaborating 
colleagues to delay publication and less likely to share their results with 
other scientists.163 Over a period of ten years, non-patent-seeking academic 
scientists also increasingly delayed their pre-publication disclosures, 
suggesting that the introduction of patents to the academic community in 
1980 via the Bayh-Dole Act shifted sharing norms in that group.164  
This case study of the academic community suggests that, rather than 
providing the incentive to share that disclosure theory posits, a patent 
actually might undermine disclosure behaviors largely governed by social 
norms.  
3.  Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory seeks to promote the efficient management of 
innovation by granting broad and early patent rights to a single actor, who 
may then—presumably with optimal efficiency—direct and coordinate 
future research and development efforts within the field of the original 
invention.165 Findings from the behavioral literature call these assumptions 
about the benefits of single-entity domination into question.166 
                                                                                                                          
158 For example, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bars an invention from being patented if it has been 
“described in a printed publication” or “in public use” for over a year before filing. The Federal Circuit 
held that a poster presentation, of the kind routinely given at academic conferences to report 
preliminary research results, counted as a “printed publication” that barred patentability under § 102(b). 
In re Klopfenstein and Brent, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
159 Rai, supra note 155, at 110–12. 
160 See, e.g., Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 
J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 (2004) (measuring the secrecy of inventors who are preparing to file a patent 
application). 
161 Id. at 74.   
162 Id.  
163 David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences: Evidence 
from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224, 1224 (1997). 
164 Id. at 78; see also Rai, supra note 155, at 109–15.  
165 See supra Part II.A.3. 
166 Prospect theory has also been heavily criticized on economic grounds. See, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048–50 
 
 2015] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PATENT PROTECTION 323 
a.  Satisficing 
The concept of satisficing was first introduced by the economist and 
psychologist Herbert Simon in the 1950s.167 He postulated that cognitive 
limitations might prevent otherwise rational actors from finding the 
optimal solution to a problem.168 As a result, these individuals might accept 
a satisfactory, but sub-optimal, alternative solution.169 This decision-
making strategy has since been observed in empirical studies.170   
Merges and Nelson have argued that satisficing behaviors might be 
relevant to the prospect theory of patents.171 Under prospect theory, the 
theoretically optimal solution for a firm with a patent is to maximize its 
value by making improvements that take full advantage of the broad scope 
of exclusivity.172 But a firm with a lucrative original invention might 
choose to settle for the financial benefits that flow from this invention 
rather than taking the risks inherent in further research and development.173 
This satisficing solution is made even more desirable by the original 
inventor’s broad patent rights, which guarantee that no other firm—without 
either arranging for a license or risking infringement—will step in to fill 
the innovative space the patentee has chosen to leave empty.174  
b.  Creativity Collaboration Research 
Even assuming that an original inventor will undertake further 
innovation and research within the broad scope of the patent contemplated 
                                                                                                                          
(1997) [hereinafter Lemley, The Economics of Improvement] (describing the problems arising from 
making inventors outline every possible future use of their inventions); Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (arguing that intellectual 
property law should give the smallest amount of protection possible while still encouraging 
innovation); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871–73 (1990) (describing the problems with single-entity domination of a 
patent). 
167 See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 
AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262–65 (1959) (discussing the differences between satisficing and maximizing in 
a firm’s decision-making). 
168 Id. at 262–63. 
169 Id. 
170 See Itamar Simonson & Aner Sela, On the Heritability of Consumer Decision Making: An 
Exploratory Approach for Studying Genetic Effects on Judgment and Choice, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 
951, 956 (2011) (analyzing different factors that influence a consumer’s choices and judgments, 
including satisficing and maximizing decision-making approaches); Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing 
Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1178 
(2002) (analyzing the happiness of maximizers and satisficers).  
171 Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 872. 
172 Lemley, supra note 22, at 738. 
173 Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 916. 
174 See id. at 842. This concern is supported by anecdotal reports. See id. at 872 n.141 (describing 
Thomas Edison’s refusal to improve his light bulb technology and his opposition to the innovation of 
alternating current); Lemley, supra note 22, at 740–41 (describing Edison’s story and also pointing to 
Watt’s decision not to improve on his steam engine). 
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by prospect theory, additional behavioral insights suggest that he may not 
be in the best position to do so.  
In particular, creativity research, as noted by intellectual property 
scholars in other contexts, suggests that collaboration can facilitate 
creativity.175 The benefits of collaboration for innovation arise because 
creative thinking often requires potential innovators to draw associations 
and make connections among disparate sources and fields.176 
Collaboration, and in particular, cross-disciplinary collaboration, facilitates 
this type of thinking because each member of a collaborative team brings a 
unique background, perspective, and specialization to the innovative 
process.177   
This finding undermines prospect theory’s premise that a single 
inventor or firm is in the best position to direct further innovation in the 
field of the patent. Even when satisficing behaviors are not present, a 
patentee seeking to improve on her original invention likely will be unable 
to achieve the same level of creative achievement alone as she would with 
input from other sources.  
Of course, even if the original inventor is not granted the broad patent 
rights that prospect theory envisions, there is no guarantee that she will 
collaborate with other individuals or firms when working to improve her 
original invention. But it is not collaboration per se that generates benefits 
for the creative process, but the exposure to diverse ideas that collaboration 
facilitates.178 And this exposure likely will still come about even if the 
original inventor is not collaborating formally with others. In the absence 
of a broad patent monopoly, we might expect that within a short period of 
time other firms will begin introducing products that build on the original 
inventor’s idea.179 The commercial availability of these products will 
                                                                                                                          
175 Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2013–16; Pedraza-Fariña, supra 
note 8, at 840–43; see also Paul B. Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad, Group Creativity: An Introduction, in 
GROUP CREATIVITY: INNOVATION THROUGH COLLABORATION (Paul B. Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad 
eds., 2003). 
176 See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2014 (discussing several 
relevant findings from the psychology and sociology literature, including the finding that individuals 
exposed to unrelated images produce more creative output than those not so exposed; that reliance on a 
more diverse set of sources is related to creativity in scientists; and that significant innovation often 
integrates principles from different fields).  
177 See id.; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 840–43. Collaborative problem-solving is not without 
potential drawbacks, however. In particular, there is a danger that group problem-solvers will engage in 
“group-think,” a phenomenon in which individuals within a group display limited or defective thinking 
as a result of efforts to avoid conflicts within the group. Garold Stasser & Zachary Birchmeier, Group 
Creativity and Collective Choice, in GROUP CREATIVITY, supra note 175, at 105. 
178 See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2014.  
179 See Lemley, supra note 22, at 740 (referring to first-mover and brand reputation benefits that 
encourage firms to enter an innovative space in the absence of patent protection). As discussed in Part 
III.B.1., supra, others might also be intrinsically motivated to create, in this case, by building on the 
original patentee’s ideas.  
 2015] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PATENT PROTECTION 325 
expose the original inventor—and others—to a range of ideas and uses that 
the inventor may not have originally contemplated.180 This exposure, in 
turn, should inspire further creativity on the part of the original inventor 
and others. 
c.  Parkinson’s Law 
Parkinson’s law is really a maxim, first proposed by the historian Cyril 
Northcote Parkinson in the 1950s. Parkinson opined that “work expands so 
as to fill the time available for its completion.”181  
Since that time, Parkinson’s law has been tested in a variety of 
experimental settings. It has been found accurately to describe, not, as 
framed by Parkinson, the physical characteristics of work, but the behavior 
of individuals engaged in this work.182 Though the work itself does not 
expand, people generally adjust their behavior so as to fill the time allotted 
to complete a project.  
Edwin Locke, a pioneer in the field of goal-setting, has shown that 
Parkinson’s law is mediated by individuals’ goal-setting behavior.183 When 
time limits are decreased, individuals set more difficult goals for 
themselves, and the more difficult goals in turn reduce time-to-completion 
and enhance performance.184 In the creative arena, empirical research 
confirms that goal-setting also leads to higher levels of creativity.185    
Parkinson’s law has potential implications for the pace of innovation 
under prospect theory. If an original inventor is granted a broad patent that 
encompasses both the original invention and future improvements, the 
inventor has a predetermined amount of time—the duration of the patent, 
presently twenty years from filing186—to enjoy that monopoly. The 
inventor thus knows in advance that he has this period, which in some 
                                                                                                                          
180 See Lemley, supra note 22, at 743 (arguing that an original inventor might be “psychologically 
tied” to a particular use of his idea and may not grasp the uses or improvements that outsiders might 
see).  
181 CYRIL NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW AND OTHER STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION 
2 (1957). 
182 E.g., Gary P. Latham & Edwin A. Locke, Increasing Productivity with Decreasing Time 
Limits: A Field Replication of Parkinson’s Law, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 524 (1975); Edwin A. 
Locke & Gary P. Latham, Building a Practically Useful Theory of Goal Setting and Task Motivation: A 
35-Year Odyssey, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 705, 705 (2002); Lawrence H. Peters et al., The Relationship 
Between Time Pressure and Performance: A Field Test of Parkinson’s Law, 5 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
BEHAV. 293, 293–94 (1984). 
183 E.g., Edwin A. Locke & Judith Bryan, The Directing Function of Goals in Task Performance, 
4 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 35 (1969).   
184 Id. 
185 E.g., Christina E. Shalley, Effects of Coaction, Expected Evaluation, and Goal Setting on 
Creativity and Productivity, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 483, 499 (1995). 
186 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
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fields is quite long compared to the average pace of innovation,187 to 
maximize patent value. According to Parkinson’s law, the inventor thus 
might set less difficult creative goals for himself, resulting in a relatively 
slow pace of innovation and less creative output. In contrast, if the inventor 
enjoys no such monopoly, he is aware that a competitor might release 
potentially lucrative downstream innovation at any time. He thus might set 
more difficult goals for himself, resulting in more creative, faster-paced 
innovation.  
It is true that even under the broad grant of rights prospect theory 
envisions, a patentee will still have an economic incentive to develop 
follow-on innovation sooner rather than later. If a patentee develops a 
commercially successful improvement covered by his patent in the first 
year of an eighteen-year patent term, for example, he can enjoy monopoly 
profits on that improvement for the remaining seventeen years of the 
patent. If, on the other hand, he waits until fifteen years of the patent term 
have passed before introducing the improvement, the total monopoly profit 
he can hope to gain from this improvement clearly will be much lower.  
This financial incentive might still not be as effective as the free-
market scenario, however, due to satisficing. Satisficing might affect not 
only, as discussed above, whether follow-on innovation occurs at all, but 
also the pace of this innovation. For instance, an original inventor with a 
broad patent might rest on the laurels of his original invention for part of 
the patent term before eventually deciding to develop follow-on 
innovation. Just as a tendency towards satisficing might overcome the 
economic incentive to maximize the patent space,188 so too might it 
overcome the incentive to engage in maximization sooner rather than later.   
4.  Commercialization 
Commercialization theory justifies the patent system as a means of 
encouraging, not (as incentive theory posits) the original creative step, nor 
(as envisioned by prospect theory) follow-on creative steps, but post-
inventive commercialization activities.189 Unlike these other utilitarian 
accounts of the patent system, the empirical psychology literature does not 
call the basic assumptions of the commercialization account into question. 
Instead, the literature generally supports the main premise of 
commercialization theory—that economic incentives might encourage 
inventors to bring their ideas to market. 
                                                                                                                          
187 The software field in particular has been noted as having a particularly fast rate of innovation. 
See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 672, 679–81, 719 (2014) (noting that the average time-to-market for innovations in the 
information-technology industries is relatively short compared to other industries). 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 171–74. 
189 See supra Part II.A.4. 
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a.  Motivation Research 
i.  Motivation to Engage in Different Types of Tasks 
As discussed in my treatment of incentive theory above, individuals 
are intrinsically motivated to engage in creative behaviors.190 Richard Ryan 
and Edward Deci have described intrinsic motivation as “the inherent 
tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s 
capacities, to explore, and to learn.”191 
Given this description, one might expect certain types of activities to 
be more susceptible to intrinsic motivation than others. In particular, 
individuals might experience relatively lower intrinsic motivation for 
activities that do not involve novelty, challenge, or the opportunity to 
exercise one’s skills, explore, or learn, as compared to those that do. 
This intuition is borne out by the psychology literature. In a review of 
the intrinsic motivation literature, Ryan and Deci explain: 
[P]eople will be intrinsically motivated only for activities that 
hold intrinsic interest for them, activities that have the appeal 
of novelty, challenge, or aesthetic value. For activities that do 
not hold such appeal, the principles of [our theoretical 
framework for intrinsic motivation] do not apply, because the 
activities will not be experienced as intrinsically motivated to 
begin with.192    
The finding that only certain types of activities inspire intrinsic 
motivation193 has implications for various accounts of the patent system. In 
the context of incentive theory, the finding that individuals are intrinsically 
motivated to create—and the subsequent conclusion by some 
commentators that a patent might not be necessary to encourage 
individuals to do so—squares well with an intuitive understanding of what 
creation is. Almost by definition, creativity involves the “novelty and 
challenge[], . . . explor[ation], . . . [and] learn[ing]” that Ryan and Deci 
speak of.194 Indeed, dictionary definitions of creativity describe it as the 
ability to “make new things or think of new ideas,”195 “transcend 
                                                                                                                          
190 AMABILE, supra note 109, at 107. 
191 Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of 
Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 70 (2000). 
192 Id. at 71. 
193 Even for categories of activities that one might expect to be intrinsically motivated, the context 
in which these activities are carried out has important implications for the degree of motivation felt. For 
example, empirical studies have shown that feelings of autonomy, competence, and relatedness each 
play an important role in determining the ultimate level of intrinsic motivation for a particular task. For 
a review of the literature, see id. at 70–71.  
194 Id. at 70. 
195 Definition of “Creative”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
creative [http://perma.cc/69XF-2D9S] (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
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traditional ideas, rules, patterns, relationships, or the like, and to create 
meaningful new ideas, forms, methods, [and] interpretations.”196  
In contrast, we may not think of the tasks that must be accomplished to 
bring a creation to market—tasks that occur after the initial inventive steps 
have been taken—as embodying the same qualities that inspire intrinsic 
motivation.  
Take, for example, the case of the pharmaceutical industry—a field for 
which it is almost universally accepted that some type of economic 
incentive is required to encourage optimal levels of innovation.197 Because 
of the intensive regulatory requirements placed on pharmaceutical 
products,198 there are many relatively routine and structured steps that need 
to be taken after the initial creative research has been completed, but before 
a potential product can be brought to market.199 These include initial 
laboratory and preclinical testing, several phases of clinical trials, and 
formulation and bioavailability studies, among other things.200 Although 
these tasks might require some creative thinking on the part of the 
employees who undertake them, it can be argued that these steps present 
fewer opportunities for “novelty and challenge[], . . . explor[ation], . . . 
[and] learn[ing]”201 than the drug discovery process that precedes them.202  
                                                                                                                          
196 Definition of “Creativity”, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
creativity [http://perma.cc/KUX3-E72M] (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
197 See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 138, at 62–63 (noting that while patents are typically 
regarded as the least effective means of economic incentive, the pharmaceutical industry provides an 
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The same can be said for other types of inventions as well. Tasks like 
market research, product management, and quality assurance, though 
perhaps more routine and thus not as intrinsically motivating as the earlier 
phases of the inventive process, are nevertheless necessary steps for 
bringing most inventions to market successfully.203 If individuals are not 
intrinsically motivated to undertake these activities, then it is possible that 
some type of external motivation, like a patent, is necessary to encourage 
this behavior. 
Empirical studies confirm that individuals may respond to external 
motivations like financial rewards when engaged in tasks that are not 
intrinsically motivating. For example, Calder and Staw first demonstrated 
that monetary rewards could increase motivation for boring tasks.204 A 
further study concluded that individuals may be more willing to engage in 
a highly structured task (as opposed to a low-structure task where there is 
more room for independence and creativity) when they receive a financial 
reward for doing so.205 And a study of recently employed professional 
graduates concluded that while individuals who choose a job based on 
salary considerations do not exhibit significantly increased intrinsic 
motivation compared to those who do not choose the job for financial 
reasons, they do exhibit increased behavioral and attitudinal commitment 
to the job.206  
ii.  A Motivational Account of Commercialization Theory 
In developing a motivational account of commercialization theory, the 
case of the pharmaceutical industry is instructive. Besides being an area 
where extensive non-intrinsically motivating work is needed to bring an 
invention to market, it is also a field where the patent system of financial 
incentives actually seems to work pretty well.207 In contrast, the software 
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industry requires a relatively slight amount of post-invention 
commercialization activity, and it is well-known that patents do little to 
encourage innovation in this field.208   
Proponents of commercialization theory have noted the relationship 
between the extent of post-innovative activity generally required to bring a 
product to market and the need for financial incentives. Based on this 
correlation, Benjamin Roin has proposed that the length of patent 
protection be keyed to the time required to bring a product to market as 
measured from the time of first patent filing.209  
Roin and others explain the correlation between time-to-market and the 
need for financial incentives in terms of economic factors such as higher 
research, development, and production costs, greater economic risk, and 
greater susceptibility to free-riding.210 But the relationship could also be 
explained in part by the motivation research. According to motivation 
theory, while financial incentives do not help—and could hurt—progress 
in fields where the bulk of the work is of the kind typically considered to 
be intrinsically motivated, these incentives can be useful when bringing a 
product to market requires a substantial amount of routine and structured 
work. This is precisely what we see in the software and pharmaceutical 
industries. 
As with every application of motivation research to the theories 
discussed in this Article, there is a major caveat to the argument that 
motivation research supports the premise of commercialization theory. 
This is the fact that most patentable innovation originates not from 
individuals but from firms, which may respond to various incentives 
differently from individuals.  
Of course, firms are made up of individuals. So at the very least, we 
might expect employees’ intrinsic motivation to lower costs for firms, and 
conversely, employees’ lack of intrinsic motivation to raise costs for firms 
as more financial incentives are required to entice employees to undertake 
non-creative work.211  
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b.  Beyond Financial Incentives 
The research discussed above provides support for the 
commercialization account by suggesting that economic incentives might 
encourage individuals to undertake the more routine post-invention tasks 
necessary to bring a product to market. But even though patents arguably 
can be justified by the commercialization account, from a behavioral 
perspective, patents might not be the only, or even the best, option for 
encouraging commercialization activity.  
i.  Encouraging Commercialization Through Internalization 
and Integration 
Additional motivation research suggests that while financial incentives 
can indeed encourage individuals to undertake non-intrinsically motivating 
tasks, the most effective means of incentivizing this work is through a 
process wherein workers “internalize” and “integrate” the task—or in other 
words, make it their own.212 Once a task—even one that is externally 
prescribed, and that outside observers might consider boring or routine—
has been internalized and integrated, the quality of motivation the 
performer feels resembles the quality of motivation experienced for 
intrinsically motivating tasks. Extrinsic incentives are no longer 
necessarily required to motivate the task’s performance.213 
Psychologists have examined the means by which internalization and 
integration of routine, mandatory tasks can be facilitated, and have 
discovered three main determinants of this process. The first is relatedness, 
or the need to feel connected to others.214 To the degree that this need can 
be satisfied by undertaking non-intrinsically motivated behaviors—
because, for example, the behaviors are modeled by others to whom an 
individual wishes to feel related—these behaviors are more likely to be 
integrated and internalized.215 The second is perceived competence, or the 
degree to which an individual feels that he can accomplish a given task 
effectively.216 And the third and most important determinant of 
                                                                                                                          
students in biology were willing to accept a decrease in pay from industry employers if the employers 
gave them the opportunity to engage in independent research and publishing. Scott Stern, Do Scientists 
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212 Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 71. 
213 See id. at 71–73.  
214 Id. at 73.  
215 Id. at 73; see also Richard M. Ryan et al., Representations of Relationships to Teachers, 
Parents, and Friends as Predictors of Academic Motivation and Self-Esteem, 14 J. EARLY 
ADOLESCENCE 226 (1994) (finding that children who had better connections with their parents and 
teachers more fully internalized the regulated behaviors of school).  
216 Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73. 
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internalization and integration is autonomy.217 As the autonomy an 
individual experiences in undertaking a task increases, the probability that 
she will internalize and integrate the task also increases, and the quality of 
motivation more closely resembles intrinsic motivation.218  
Empirical studies also suggest that encouraging internalization and 
integration of mandatory and routine tasks achieves more desirable 
outcomes than incentivizing these tasks via external regulation and reward. 
As these tasks become more internalized and integrated, a variety of 
desirable outcomes, including greater interest and effort in, and enjoyment 
and performance of, the tasks ensue.219 Conversely, lower internalization 
and increased responsiveness to external regulation and reward results in 
less interest and effort, greater anxiety, and increased blaming behavior.220  
ii.  Promoting Internalization and Integration 
If, as commercialization theory proposes, the goal of a patent is to 
motivate individuals to undertake commercialization activities, the 
financial reward a patent offers is likely effective. But it might not be the 
optimal way to achieve this goal. Instead, policymakers seeking to 
encourage commercialization might achieve better success by facilitating 
development and commercialization environments that are “autonomy 
supportive”—that is, where the individuals involved feel related, 
competent, and autonomous, and are therefore more likely to internalize 
and integrate routine tasks. 
Consistent with this conclusion are the results of an empirical study 
that looked at motivation, effort, and performance of over 11,000 
employees performing either research or development tasks in a range of 
manufacturing and service sectors. According to the results of the study, 
while intrinsic motivators played the most significant role in motivating 
basic and applied research activity (which, as described above, one might 
consider to be intrinsically motivating), employee independence was the 
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most significant motivator of development or commercialization activity 
(which one might consider to be less intrinsically motivating).221 Financial 
reward, in the form of salary, had a lesser, positive effect on the 
productivity of those engaged in either research or development.222  
Facilitating autonomy-supportive commercialization environments 
might seem like a vague and daunting task when compared to the 
comparative simplicity of offering a financial reward. But this goal can be 
achieved in surprisingly simple ways, such as providing individuals with a 
meaningful rationale for their work, giving timely and appropriate 
feedback, including variety in the tasks an individual is asked to perform, 
and giving individuals opportunities to participate in professional 
communities.223 Further, given the deadweight loss that inevitably results 
from patent monopolies,224 these types of interventions might prove to be 
less economically and socially costly than the current patent system.  
Again, these findings from the motivation literature apply to 
individuals and not necessarily to organizations. And it is reasonable to 
assume that—perhaps to an even greater degree than for initial invention—
commercialization, which may not be intrinsically motivating and which 
often requires specialized expertise, equipment, and other resources, is 
largely undertaken by or in conjunction with firms.225 But the empirical 
results discussed here do apply to individuals working for firms in the 
context of an employer-employee relationship.226 Thus, to the extent that 
firms—who are likely in the best position to do so—facilitate autonomy-
supportive environments for their employees, they will reap the reward of 
lowered costs resulting from the employees’ improved motivation and 
performance.  
Whether this subsidy would be sufficient, in and of itself, to motivate 
rational-actor firms to undertake commercialization activities is unclear. 
The case of the pharmaceutical industry suggests perhaps not. But, at the 
very least, increased firm awareness of the financial benefits flowing from 
these interventions might allow us to decrease the economic reward needed 
to encourage commercialization—through shortened patent terms, for 
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example.227 Under commercialization theory, to the extent monopolies can 
be minimized while still maintaining optimal incentives to commercialize, 
society benefits.       
5.  Patent Racing Theory 
According to the patent racing account, a patent is not required to 
incentivize invention in the first instance,228 but speeds the pace of 
innovation as inventors working on the same problem race either to reap 
the patent’s financial reward229 or avoid being taxed for practicing their 
own invention.230 The psychology literature suggests that competition can 
indeed enhance innovation under certain conditions. These conditions, 
however, are not necessarily those our current patent system facilitates. 
a.  Motivation Research 
The motivation research is relevant to patent racing theory. If, as this 
research suggests, individuals need no external incentives to be creative 
because they are intrinsically motivated to be so, we might assume that 
these same individuals will not respond to external incentives designed to 
speed the pace of their creative activity.231 It is possible, however, that the 
competitive environment patent racing theory emphasizes changes the 
calculus of motivation. An in-depth look at the psychology of competition 
is thus in order.   
b.  Competition Research 
The psychology literature examining the relationship between 
competition and performance is complex. Two strains of competition 
research informative for purposes of this Article are the literature 
examining the relationship between competition and individual motivation 
and the literature examining the relationship between competition and 
individual goal setting. 
i.  Competition and Motivation 
A number of studies have explored the effects of competition on 
intrinsic motivation. An important conclusion is that competition, in 
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certain contexts, can enhance intrinsic motivation.232 This is so because 
winning plays an important informational role that increases an 
individual’s perceived competence at a task.233  
This finding, consistent with patent racing theory, suggests that 
competition can indeed be beneficial for innovation. The right kind of 
competition can enhance intrinsic motivation, and, as discussed earlier, 
enhanced intrinsic motivation is associated with higher creativity and 
better performance on a variety of tasks.234  
It is not known, however, whether the current patent system offers the 
“right” kind of competition for purposes of enhancing motivation and 
creativity. The benefits of competition for intrinsic motivation do not 
accrue when the context of the competition is construed by the competitor 
as controlling—when there is high external pressure to win.235 If the 
prospect of a financial reward causes firms and universities to impose 
significant pressure on the inventors they employ, the competition induced 
by a patent race might have detrimental effects on motivation and 
innovation generally.   
ii.  Competition and Goal Setting 
As discussed in the earlier analysis of prospect theory, when 
individuals are time-constrained, they tend to set more difficult goals for 
themselves and accomplish tasks more quickly.236 This finding also has 
relevance for patent racing theory. If a competitive environment causes 
individuals to feel time-constrained and set more difficult inventive goals 
for themselves, a patent race might speed the pace of innovation as patent 
racing theory postulates.    
Supporting this hypothesis, an empirical study examining the 
relationship between goal setting and competition concluded that 
participants who set more difficult goals for themselves showed enhanced 
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performance on a set of routine tasks.237 But the study also surprisingly 
found that when individuals had already set goals, the additional presence 
of competition did not enhance task performance, and in fact detracted 
from it.238 The authors of the study hypothesized that the decreased 
performance resulted from lowered concentration or increased anxiety in 
the presence of competition.239    
This study examined performance on routine arithmetic tasks rather 
than the more difficult tasks one would expect to be associated with the 
process of innovation.240 Nevertheless, its findings are consistent with the 
idea that competition may be beneficial to the individual creative process 
only under certain conditions—in particular, when the competition does 
not impose undue external pressure on an individual that might interfere 
with cognitive processes.  
Also consistent with this conclusion is additional goal-setting research 
that reveals the importance of framing. When a goal is presented as a 
threat, with an emphasis on failing, performance is decreased compared to 
when the same goal is presented as a challenge, with an emphasis on 
success and the utility of the effort put in by the individual.241  
The framing results are particularly relevant to the iteration of patent 
racing theory in which the patent acts as a “stick” rather than a “carrot”—
where inventors race for a patent not because they want the reward, but 
because they fear being excluded from practicing their own invention.242 
Because framing goals as efforts to avoid failure decreases individual 
performance, the “stick” model of patent racing might not be the optimal 
way to enhance creativity and innovation.243 
iii.  Competition Conclusions 
Overall, the competition research suggests that competition has 
positive effects on innovation when it provides competence information 
and allows for high goal setting, but detracts from innovation when it poses 
a threat or results in a controlling situation.  
One way to take advantage of the benefits of competition while 
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avoiding its pitfalls would be to offer a primarily attributional reward, 
where “winning” inventors are publicly announced. This attributional 
system sets up positive competition for reputational gain and competence 
feedback, but does not pose a threat of significant financial loss or give 
employers reason to pressure inventors in ways that are detrimental to 
creativity.  
C.  Psychology and Non-Utilitarian Accounts of the Patent System 
As discussed above, behavioral research can illuminate utilitarian 
accounts of the patent system by elucidating how people respond to 
incentives in real-world scenarios.  
In contrast, non-utilitarian accounts of patents are based largely on 
deontological conceptions and generally do not depend on individuals 
responding to incentives in particular ways. But behavioral work can still 
serve as an important tool to evaluate these theories.  
First, psychology research can elucidate the psychological salience of 
various rights. Labor-desert theory, for example, justifies patent rights as a 
just reward for an inventor’s hard work. Behavioral research can help us 
understand how much inventors, and society at large, are concerned about 
justice in this context. Research showing that these groups are anxious 
about fairness could bolster labor-desert theory. Conversely, if research 
suggests that a fair reward for innovative labor is not a consideration for 
inventors or the general populace, we might question whether labor-desert 
is a valid justification for strong intellectual property rights.   
Second, and relatedly, behavioral findings can give us insights into the 
consequences, good or bad, that might result if we honor or fail to honor 
certain rights deemed important by deontologists. If negative consequences 
flow from a failure to honor these rights, the case for granting them may be 
strengthened; but if not granting the rights does not result in measurable 
psychological or behavioral harm, or if granting the rights actually causes 
harm, we may again question the utility of these rights.         
Admittedly, this line of analysis puts a consequentialist spin on non-
utilitarian theories because it seeks to justify or discredit these theories on 
the basis of their psychological and behavioral consequences. The 
approach is consistent with the practical focus of this Article, which, as 
mentioned above, seeks to harness the behavioral literature to develop an 
intellectual property regime that maximizes social value (broadly defined) 
while minimizing social costs. Not everyone will agree with this approach; 
a non-utilitarian theorist might argue, for example, that we should honor an 
inventor’s personality rights regardless of whether the inventor (or society 
as a whole) cares about them and even if doing so leads on balance to 
social harm, because it is the morally correct thing to do. Although this 
Article adopts a different view, it does not seek to challenge this argument. 
Behavioral research can be used to evaluate non-utilitarian theories in a 
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third way, arguably useful even to those who reject any attempts to 
evaluate the theories on consequentialist grounds. This is to determine 
whether our current system honors the interests implicated by non-
utilitarian theories in a psychologically salient way, and, if not, to give 
insights into how this might best be done. For example, behavioral 
research could help us determine whether inventors’ personality interests 
are best honored through a monetary award, attribution, ongoing control 
over works, a combination of these, or something else. Though the existing 
behavioral literature does not definitively answer all of the types of 
questions discussed here that it could potentially answer, it does shed light 
on some of them, as I now discuss.  
1.  Labor-Desert Theory 
The labor-desert account envisions a patent as a reward for the labor an 
inventor invests in her creation.244 A proviso to this theory is that a patent 
should not be granted when doing so harms others,245 generally understood 
in the patent context as inappropriately excluding others from the public 
domain.246  
a.  Fairness Research 
The labor-desert theory implicates notions of fairness. We grant a 
patent to an inventor because she has earned natural rights in her invention, 
and it is thus the just thing to do.  
Ample psychological evidence supports the idea that humans feel 
strongly about fairness.247 Babies as young as fifteen months old favor 
experimenters who distribute toys evenly over those who do not.248 
Children as young as three take merit into consideration when asked to 
distribute stickers.249 And when placed in a game situation, adult subjects 
are much happier when they receive a financial reward they perceive as 
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fair than when they receive the same reward but perceive it to be unfair.250 
When these subjects’ brains were scanned, the authors of this latter study 
found that accepting the “fair” reward activated centers of the brain 
normally associated with reward.251 Conversely, accepting the “unfair” 
reward activated centers of the brain associated with self-control, 
suggesting that to accept the reward, an individual had to overcome the 
strong negative emotions associated with unfair treatment.252  
b.  Fairness and Innovation 
More specifically for purposes of this Article, empirical results suggest 
that our basic drive towards fairness extends to rewards for innovative 
behavior. For example, a study by Onne Janssen concluded that employees 
engage in more innovative work behaviors in response to job demands 
when they perceive the rewards reaped from their efforts to be fair versus 
unfair.253 In a later study, Janssen found that employees find innovation 
stressful when fairness is low.254 The latter finding is significant because 
excess stress is known to have adverse effects on performance and 
motivation.255  
c.  Supporting Labor-Desert 
These findings generally support, on consequentialist grounds, the 
labor-desert account of patent law.256 Ignoring the fairness considerations 
labor-desert theory implicates may result in both psychological and 
innovative harms, while honoring them may promote innovative 
                                                                                                                          
250 Golnaz Tabibnia et al., The Sunny Side of Fairness: Preference for Fairness Activates Reward 
Circuitry (and Disregarding Unfairness Activates Self-Control Circuitry), 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 339, 341 
(2008). 
251 Id. at 342. These same centers are activated when an individual partakes in good food, sex, or 
mood-enhancing drugs. E.g., Kenneth Blum et al., Sex, Drugs, and Rock ‘N’ Roll: Hypothesizing 
Common Mesolimbic Activation as a Function of Reward Gene Polymorphisms, 44 J. PSYCHOACTIVE 
DRUGS 38, 39 (2012).  
252 Tabibnia et al., supra note 250, at 343–44. 
253 Onne Janssen, Job Demands, Perceptions of Effort-Reward Fairness and Innovative Work 
Behaviour, 73 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 287, 297 (2000). 
254 Onne Janssen, How Fairness Perceptions Make Innovative Behavior More or Less Stressful, 
25 J. ORG. BEHAV. 201, 209 (2004). 
255 See generally STRESS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE (James E. Driskell & Eduardo Salas eds., 
2013). 
256 The notion that a preference for fairness may be “hard-wired” into our systems might also help 
explain why, though fairness is not an explicit aspect of patent law, congressional and judicial attitudes 
toward intellectual property rights often implicitly reflect fairness concerns. See supra Part II.B.1; 
sources cited supra note 74. Moreover, empirical work by Gregory Mandel suggests that a large 
segment of the population believes that intellectual property exists to protect inventors’ natural rights in 
their creations. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
261, 287 (2014). 
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behaviors.257  
Designing a legal environment that creators and the public perceive as 
fair may not necessarily require granting financial rewards to inventors, 
however. In the study finding a positive relationship between innovative 
behavior and perceived fairness, the questionnaire meant to unearth notions 
of fairness did not explicitly reference financial compensation.258 Instead, it 
arguably focused more on attributional than financial concerns, asking 
subjects to agree or disagree with such statements as “I give a great deal of 
time and attention to the organization, but get very little appreciation”; “I 
put more energy into my job than it is worth”; and “I feel unfairly treated 
in my job.”259 Consistent with earlier conclusions of this Article, then, an 
attributional reward might help achieve many of the proposed goals of the 
patent system, including, in this case, the satisfaction of fairness 
considerations.260 Notably, a purely attributional reward would also satisfy 
the “no-harm” proviso that labor-desert theory mandates, because it would 
not remove inventions from the public domain. 
2.  Personality Theory 
Personality theory holds that an inventor has a personality interest in 
his discovery that merits protection.261 Although there is surprisingly little 
empirical research testing this claim, preliminary work does seem to 
support the idea of a personality interest in creation. 262 
a.  Feelings of Ownership and Valuation 
Many inventors engage in creative work primarily to satisfy a need for 
self-expression.263 More specifically, a qualitative study of employees 
working at a video game design studio concluded that these individuals do 
in fact experience a feeling of psychological ownership over their 
innovative work product.264 Empirical work by Christopher Buccafusco 
and Christopher Sprigman further suggests that creators of intrinsically 
motivated work may value their creations more highly than those of works 
                                                                                                                          
257 See generally Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright 
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
258 Janssen, supra note 253, at 291–92.  
259 Id.  
260 Jeanne Fromer has also argued that an attributional award could help advance the fairness and 
personality interests implicated by the creative process. Fromer, supra note 75, at 1791–98.  
261 See supra Part II.B.2.    
262 Elizabeth Rouse, Kill Your Darlings? Experiencing, Maintaining, and Changing Psychological 
Ownership in Creative Work 4–5 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College), 
http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:101452 [https://perma.cc/9GZP-GR8W].   
263 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1771–72 & n.152 (citing JOSEPH ROSSMAN, INDUSTRIAL 
CREATIVITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVENTOR 200 (1964)); Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 221, 
at 2134. 
264 Rouse, supra note 262, at 3.  
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that are not intrinsically motivated.265 
b.  Effects of Relinquishing Control 
If a personality interest in invention is a real psychological 
phenomenon, it is useful from a consequentialist perspective to determine 
what negative effects, if any, flow from the failure to validate this interest.  
A recent study by On Amir and Orly Lobel suggests that loss of 
control over intellectual work product might result in decreased motivation 
and performance.266 The study measured task performance in a group of 
subjects under restrictions that caused them to relinquish ownership of 
their work product and limited their future ability to perform the same task 
in other contexts. Compared to a control group under no such restrictions, 
these subjects spent less time and were less focused on the tasks, and 
committed twice as many performance errors.267  
These negative effects were less pronounced when subjects were asked 
to perform what the authors classified as a “creative” task (a word-
association activity) versus a task classified as purely effort-based 
(searching matrices for numbers adding up to ten).268 The study’s authors 
hypothesized that the intrinsic motivation presumably triggered by the 
creative task served to mitigate the negative effects flowing from loss of 
ownership.269  
This latter finding raises an interesting question for personality theory. 
Legal scholars writing in a personality theory vein have suggested that 
personality rights are particularly important for creative works.270 Going 
further, Justin Hughes argues that more expressive creative works, i.e., 
artistic pursuits, are more deserving of personality rights than less 
expressive works, i.e., scientific inventions.271 
But though it might be true that an individual’s ownership interest is 
stronger for more creative versus less creative work,272 Amir and Lobel’s 
                                                                                                                          
265 Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 31, 46 (2011). 
266 On Amir & Orly Lobel, How Noncompetes Stifle Performance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 
2014, at 26.    
267 Id.; see also Orly Lobel, Op-Ed., My Ideas, My Boss’s Property, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/my-ideas-my-bosss-property.html (arguing that when 
corporations force their inventors to pre-assign their intellectual property, inventors lose their “creative 
fire” and produce fewer inventor-owned patents). 
268 Amir & Lobel, supra note 266. 
269 Id. 
270 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1754; Hughes, supra note 70, at 340–43. 
271 Sources cited supra note 270.   
272 Although, as discussed in Part III.C.2.a, supra, preliminary evidence shows that creative works 
invoke feelings of psychological ownership, there is no empirical evidence to support or refute 
Hughes’s additional hypothesis: that artistic works invoke stronger feelings of psychological ownership 
and intrinsic motivation than scientific works. In the motivation literature, both scientific and artistic 
pursuits are considered to be creative and intrinsically motivating; and, as mentioned already, there is 
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study suggests that the negative effects on innovation flowing from loss of 
this ownership are lower for more creative versus less creative work, due 
to the mitigating effects of intrinsic motivation. If, as Jeanne Fromer has 
recommended, our aim is to administer personality rights within a 
utilitarian framework, such that personality rights are granted only if the 
benefits outweigh the costs,273 this finding suggests that personality rights 
may be less desirable for more creative and therefore more intrinsically 
motivating works.274 
c.  Implementing Personality Theory 
If, for whatever reason, we decide that a patent system that respects 
personality rights is justified, then the question becomes how to 
accomplish this task. Fromer and Hughes have each suggested that the 
personality interests of inventors can be satisfied, at least in part, by 
granting attribution rights.275  
The conceptual relationship between labor-desert theory and 
personality theory also suggests that attribution might go a long way 
towards satisfying personality interests. Psychologists have conceptualized 
the personality interest individuals feel in their creations as the result of the 
“efforts, time, and attention” invested in them.276 Thus, to the extent that 
empirical results support the use of attribution for satisfying labor-desert 
concerns,277 they might also support the same approach for satisfying 
personality concerns.  
Because the personality interest conceives of an invention as the 
                                                                                                                          
little empirical research examining personality interests in creative works of any kind. One study from 
the motivation literature examining levels of motivation in a variety of high school courses found the 
highest levels of motivation in art and computer science classes—but this was likely related to the 
relatively high level of active participation in these classes compared to more passive lecture-based 
courses like Math and English. David J. Shernoff et al., Student Engagement in High School 
Classrooms from the Perspective of Flow Theory, 18 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 158, 170 (2003).  
273 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1779. 
274 This conclusion is consistent with my earlier conclusion that while incentives to innovate 
might not be required for the intrinsically motivating work of creation, they might be needed for the 
less intrinsically motivating work of implementation and commercialization. See supra Parts III.B.1, 
III.B.4. Of course, we might also decide that personality rights are important, not because an economic 
analysis concludes that they will have positive effects on innovation, but simply because we believe, 
from a deontological perspective, that an inventor has a right to such protection. 
275 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790–92; Hughes, supra note 70, at 349; see also Rosenblatt, supra 
note 5, at 457. Fromer, for example, cites empirical evidence suggesting that creators will accept lower 
license fees for their works in exchange for attribution. Fromer, supra note 75, at 1791 (citing 
Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of 
Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1415–16 (2013)). 
276 Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139, 144 (1988); 
see also MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: 
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 248–49 (1981). Legal theorists have also noted the similarities 
between the personality and fairness theories. See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1753. 
277 See supra Part III.C.1.b. 
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extension of its creator, however, it implicates issues of control that the 
labor-desert account does not.278 Amir and Lobel’s empirical study 
indirectly279 suggests that ongoing control may be an important 
motivator—although it seems to be less important when the work is 
intrinsically motivating, as most inventive work is.280  
But granting inventors lasting control over their creations might have 
detrimental effects on innovation, for example by stifling user innovation 
or improvements. If we take a consequentialist approach to implementing 
personality theory, we might ask whether the benefits we hope to gain 
from granting inventors lasting control over their inventions (measured, for 
example, in increased motivations to invent or increased societal well-
being) are worth the costs (measured, for example, in decreased follow-on 
innovation). Another possibility involves granting a limited control—like 
that codified in the Visual Artists Rights Act—that gives inventors, for 
example, the right to prevent the unauthorized use of their name in 
conjunction with modified works.281  
3.  Social Planning Theory 
Social planning theory posits that patent rules should be structured so 
as to promote a “just and attractive culture,”282 as measured by a range of 
metrics beyond economic welfare. Scholars have proposed a number of 
values to be taken into consideration, and have hypothesized how 
intellectual property rights—particularly in the copyright and publicity 
contexts—might be structured to advance these values.283  
Social planning theory is not so much a justification of the current 
patent system as it is an aspirational statement about how intellectual 
property rights ideally should be structured. Scholars working in this vein 
have proposed that the patent system should promote the values of 
autonomy, culture, democracy, equality, development, creativity, 
community, happiness, respect, and opportunities for meaningful work and 
self-determination.284   
                                                                                                                          
278 Fromer, supra note 75, at 1770; Hughes, supra note 70, at 344. 
279 The study does not directly investigate the effects of lack of control. The restricted subjects 
transferred ownership of their work product and could not perform similar tasks for others in the future. 
Although the transfer of ownership necessarily entailed relinquishment of control, the loss of 
motivation associated with the transfer might have been due to the loss of attribution the transfer 
entailed or the inability to continue working on tasks the workers enjoyed.   
280 Amir & Lobel, supra note 266.  
281 See supra Part II.B.2. 
282 Fisher, supra note 1, at 171–72.  
283 See supra Part III.B.3. 
284 See Fisher, supra note 87, at 1687; Sunder, supra note 88, at 324–25.   
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a.  Social Planning Values and Well-Being 
Social planning theorists’ assertion that the above-listed values will 
contribute to the “just and attractive culture” that is the stated goal of the 
theory is largely supported by the empirical literature. In particular, there is 
a robust psychology literature demonstrating that the values of 
autonomy,285 competence,286 engagement in meaningful work,287 self-
expression,288 and community289 are positively related to measures of well-
                                                                                                                          
285 Marc R. Blais et al., Toward a Motivational Model of Couple Happiness, 59 J. PERSONALITY. 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1021, 1021–22, 1027, 1030 (1990); Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The 
“What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227, 231–34, 241–43, 253, 263 (2000); C. Raymond Knee et al., Self-
Determination and Conflict in Romantic Relationships, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 997, 
997–1000 (2005); Harry T. Reis et al., Daily Well-Being: The Role of Autonomy, Competence, and 
Relatedness, 26 SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 419, 424 (2000); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On 
Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 141, 156–57, 159–61 (2001); Richard M. Ryan et al., On the Interpersonal 
Regulation of Emotions: Emotional Reliance Across Gender, Relationships, and Cultures, 12 PERS. 
RELATIONSHIPS 145, 149 (2005); see also Reed W. Larson, Toward a Psychology of Positive Youth 
Development, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 170, 170 (2000); Richard M. Ryan et al., The Significance of 
Autonomy and Autonomy Support in Psychological Development and Psychopathology, in 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THEORY AND METHOD 795, 802 (Dante Cicchetti & Donald J. 
Cohen eds., 2006) [hereinafter Ryan et al., The Significance of Autonomy].  
286 Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates of Financial 
Success as a Central Life Aspiration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410, 420 (1993); Tim 
Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 280, 280 (1996); Reis et al., 
supra note 285, at 424; Kennon M. Sheldon & Tim Kasser, Coherence and Congruence: Two Aspects 
of Personality Integration, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531 (1995); see also Ryan et al., 
The Significance of Autonomy, supra note 285, at 832; Martin E.P. Seligman, Positive Psychotherapy, 
61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 774, 776–77 (2006).      
287 Amy Love Collins et al., Flow and Happiness in Later Life: An Investigation into the Role of 
Daily and Weekly Flow Experiences, 10 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 703, 704 (2009); Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi & Jeremy Hunter, Happiness in Everyday Life: The Uses of Experience Sampling, 4 
J. HAPPINESS STUD. 185, 186, 194 (2003); Jeanne Nakamura & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Concept 
of Flow, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 90 (C.R. Snyder & Shane Lopez eds., 2002); 
Seligman, supra note 286, at 777; Anne J. Wells, Self-Esteem and Optimal Experience, in OPTIMAL 
EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS 327 (Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi 
& Isabella Csikszentmihalyi eds., 1988). 
288 See Sherry L. Dupuis & Bryan J.A. Smale, An Examination of Relationship Between 
Psychological Well-Being and Depression and Leisure Activity Participation Among Older Adults, 18 
LOISIR ET SOCIÉTÉ 67 (1995); Ana Puig et al., The Efficacy of Creative Arts Therapies to Enhance 
Emotional Expression, Spirituality, and Psychological Well-Being of Newly Diagnosed Stage I and 
Stage II Breast Cancer Patients: A Preliminary Study, 33 ARTS PSYCHOTHERAPY 218, 224 (2006) 
(finding that creative arts therapy intervention enhanced psychological well-being in subjects); Kennon 
M. Sheldon et al., Trait Self and True Self: Cross-Role Variation in the Big-Five Personality Traits 
with Psychological Authenticity and Subjective Well-Being, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1380, 1380 (1997) (finding that increased opportunities for authenticity and self-expression led to more 
agreeableness, openness, and greater satisfaction in employment). 
289 See, e.g., Ellen Berscheid & Harry T. Reis, Interpersonal Attraction and Close Relationships, 
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 1998); see also ANGUS CAMPBELL 
ET AL., THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE: PERCEPTIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS (1976); 
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being and flourishing. 
b.  Social Planning Values and Innovation 
Perhaps more salient to those with a welfarist bent, some of the values 
social planning theory seeks to promote are also related to positive 
innovation outcomes. For example, autonomy increases intrinsic 
motivation, which in turn enhances creative output.290 Feelings of 
competence are related to higher academic achievement.291 And 
opportunities for self-expression and community may also lead to 
increased intrinsic motivation.292 These values should thus be of interest to 
anyone concerned with promoting creativity and innovative behavior. 
c.  Social Planning—Prescriptions 
As discussed throughout this Article, the financial reward a patent 
offers does not necessarily enhance creative output or motivations to 
innovate. But as my analysis in this Part suggests, promoting values 
consistent with a “just and attractive culture” may benefit society generally 
through enhanced well-being and specifically through incentives to 
innovate.  
As far as the innovation-enhancing benefits of these principles are 
concerned, to the extent that innovation happens in private organizations, 
employers might be in the best position to promote them.293 Even if firms 
as a whole behave like rational actors, they have a financial incentive to 
endorse these values, since they can expect gains in productivity and 
creative output from their employees as a result.  
For innovation that takes place in the academic setting, policy reforms 
that ensure research funding is administered in a way that promotes, rather 
                                                                                                                          
Reed W. Larson & Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, The Experience Sampling Method, 15 NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 41 (1983); Reis et al., supra note 285, at 420; Wolfgang 
Stroebe & Margaret Stroebe, The Social Psychology of Social Support, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 597 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996). 
290 See Teresa M. Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity: A Componential 
Conceptualization, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 364 (1983) (finding that the positive 
effects of autonomy on motivation are strengthened when the task is a creative one); Marylène Gagné 
& Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and Work Motivation, 26 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
331, 342, 355 (2005) (finding that job motivation and performance are positively related to autonomy 
support by managers); see also supra Part III.B.4.b.     
291 Hyungshim Jang et al., Can Self-Determination Theory Explain What Underlies the 
Productive, Satisfying Learning Experiences of Collectivistically Oriented Korean Students, 101 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 644, 644 (2009) (finding that experiences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
led to better learning outcomes in Korean students).   
292 See Ryan & Connell, supra note 220, at 749; Sheldon & Kasser, supra note 286, at 534 
(finding that increased opportunities for authenticity and self-expression led to enhanced intrinsic 
motivation in employment); see also supra Part III.B.4.b (analyzing the role of relatedness in 
improving intrinsic motivation). 
293 See supra Part III.B.4.b.  
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than detracts from, the innovation-enhancing principles of autonomy, 
engagement, community, and so on, are in order. For example, the research 
funding structure could promote community by offering funds for 
collaborative research projects.294 And the funding scheme could be 
administered in such a way that academic researchers have more autonomy 
to choose the particular projects that interest them, even if these projects 
present a greater scientific or financial risk.295  
 IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
Though by no means comprehensive, the above analysis provides a 
starting point for evaluating the various accounts of the patent system from 
a behavioral perspective. This analysis can help us determine whether the 
patent system is justified under any account, and can give us ideas for 
building a patent system that accomplishes more of what we want it to 
accomplish. Here, I summarize the results and discuss some of their 
implications.  
A.  Commercialization Theory 
1.  Support from Psychology 
From a purely behavioral perspective, my analysis suggests that 
commercialization theory provides the strongest justification for a system 
that, like ours, provides a primarily financial reward.296 While the early 
creative steps of the innovative process are intrinsically motivating and 
may be harmed rather than helped by an external financial reward,297 an 
economic reward is likely of some use for incentivizing the more routine 
and structured tasks associated with implementation and 
                                                                                                                          
294 Promoting collaborative and, in particular, interdisciplinary research projects would be 
expected to result in additional gains in innovation. See supra Part III.B.3.b. 
295 A recent popular press article tells the story of two academic research scientists who left their 
careers because they felt constrained by the current funding scheme that allowed them to work only on 
conservative and incremental research. Richard Harris, When Scientists Give Up, NPR (Sept. 9, 2014, 
4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/09/09/345289127/when-scientists-give-up. This is an 
extreme example of lost motivation that can occur when autonomy is curtailed. On the positive side, 
when researchers are given the autonomy to work on what interests them, we might expect enhanced 
creative output. In a story about a researcher who received “very special funding from the National 
Institutes of Health . . . that g[ave him] unbridled funds for [him] to do anything [he] s[aw] fit,” the 
researcher explained that this funding “really emboldened [his group] to explore very new directions.” 
Jon Hamilton, A Scientist Deploys Light and Sound to Reveal the Brain, NPR (July 27, 2015, 3:57 
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/07/27/425068015/a-scientist-deploys-light-and-
sound-to-reveal-the-brain. 
296 See supra Part III.B.4. It should be noted that this conclusion rests entirely on my analysis of 
the psychology literature and does not take into account the many economic arguments advanced for 
and against commercialization theory.  
297 Id. 
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commercialization.298  
Further, though this Article focuses primarily on individual-level 
psychological factors rather than firm-level dynamics, the 
commercialization phase of innovation may—due to financing and 
equipment requirements and economies of scale—be more likely to require 
participation from a large firm.299 To the extent that these firms behave 
more like rational actors and less like individuals subject to psychological 
forces, a financial reward might be required to incentivize 
commercialization decisions that take place primarily at the organizational 
level.   
This latter dynamic might change over time as technological advances 
make it easier for individuals and small groups to undertake 
commercialization on their own.300 Johnson has made a similar point and 
provides the example of home recording systems that make it much easier 
for individuals to produce music without the involvement of expensive 
studios.301 Another recent example is the 3-D printer, which allows 
individuals to self-produce a number of products of their own design.302 As 
these technologies proliferate and become cheaper, reduced financial 
incentives, in conjunction with more effective kinds of individual-level 
behavioral incentives, may be in order.     
2.  Structuring Commercialization 
Assuming for the present that some financial incentive is required to 
encourage commercialization, how should a patent system designed for 
this purpose be structured? Though our current system likely meets the 
goals of commercialization theory more effectively than those of any other 
theory, a system specifically designed to foster commercialization would 
diverge in important ways from our present regime. Sichelman, in his call 
for a new commercialization patent, discusses in some detail what a 
commercialization patent might look like in terms of scope and 
patentability requirements.303 And as Roin has suggested, a 
commercialization-focused scheme could be tailored so that products 
requiring more time (and, consequently, more time engaged in routine 
work) and resources to be brought to market are granted a proportionally 
                                                                                                                          
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Johnson, supra note 8, at 672–75.  
301 Id. 
302 See generally Lucas Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing 
Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811 (2014) (identifying and analyzing the implications 
of 3-D printing technology for copyright law). 
303 Sichelman, supra note 45, at 400–11.  
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greater financial incentive.304  
B.  Other Theories 
In contrast to commercialization theory, the behavioral literature 
suggests that a financial incentive may not be the most effective means of 
achieving the ends and means put forth by the other accounts of the patent 
system.    
The intrinsic motivation literature, for example, suggests that external 
financial incentives may not be helpful for motivating individuals to either 
engage in creative behavior (as incentive theory posits)305 or share the 
results of their efforts (as disclosure theory posits).306 Although the 
literature suggests that competition can enhance creative performance 
under certain conditions (as patent racing theory proposes),307 the current 
patent system, which poses a threat of potentially significant financial 
harm to the loser of a patent race, likely does not satisfy these 
conditions.308        
Though psychology research suggests that desert, personality, and 
social planning values are significant human concerns which, if respected, 
have the potential to promote innovative behavior,309 there is little evidence 
to suggest that a financial reward is the best, or even an effective, way to 
satisfy these concerns.       
The account that garners the least support from the behavioral 
literature is prospect theory.310 Research studying the effects of 
collaboration, goal-setting, and cognitive limitations on creative 
performance suggests that granting a broad patent to a single actor in order 
to allow the actor to exploit the field is likely counterproductive for 
innovation. This finding is consistent with economic criticisms of prospect 
theory,311 and suggests that prospect theory be abandoned as a viable 
approach to patent law.    
                                                                                                                          
304 Roin, supra note 187. 
305 See supra Part III.B.1. 
306 See supra Part III.B.2. 
307 See supra Part III.B.5. 
308 See Locke & Latham, supra note 241, at 266.     
309 The behavioral literature itself supports this utilitarian spin on the non-utilitarian patent 
theories. Some proponents of these theories, taking a rights-based approach, would argue that these 
values should be promoted regardless of the utilitarian outcome. While this might be true, it is also true, 
according to the behavioral literature, that promoting these values in the innovation context likely will 
have positive effects on innovation. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.3.b.      
310 See id. 
311 See, e.g., Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, supra note 166, at 1048–58 (criticizing 
prospect theory on economic grounds). 
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C.  The Importance of Attribution 
The idea of attribution is not new: a number of intellectual property 
scholars have argued that attribution should play a more prominent role in 
the intellectual property system.312 But one of the more striking results to 
come from this analysis is the extent to which an attribution right has the 
potential to achieve many of the goals proposed by disparate accounts of 
the patent system. 
Empirical research, for example, suggests that the reputational and 
feedback benefits flowing from attribution are significant motivators of 
disclosure—the means to promoting innovation set forth by disclosure 
theory.313 A primarily attributional reward could also create the “right” 
kind of competitive scenario that has the potential to speed the pace of 
innovation, consistent with racing theory.314 For non-utilitarian accounts of 
the patent system, empirical research suggests that an attributional reward 
could go a long way towards satisfying inventors’ natural rights and 
personality concerns.315 
Moreover, attributional rewards are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the commercialization-focused rewards described above. According to the 
behavioral research, the goals we can hope to achieve via attribution—
namely, motivating disclosure and productive competition and satisfying 
desert and personality concerns—are generally associated with the early, 
creative phases of innovation rather than the later implementation 
phases.316 A two-track patent system similar to that proposed by 
Sichelman, with separate rewards317 offered for the creative and 
commercialization phases of innovation, could take advantage of this 
insight. Under my proposal, however, the first track would focus on 
attribution, rather than a financial reward, for early-stage creation. The 
second track would aim to promote commercialization through a 
commercialization patent.318    
                                                                                                                          
312 E.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 478–79. But cf. Sprigman et 
al., supra note 275, at 1415–16 (proposing caution in strengthening attribution rights). 
313 See supra Part III.B.2. 
314 See supra Part III.B.5. 
315 See supra Part III.C.1–2. 
316 See supra Part II. 
317 See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1780 (discussing the possibility of splitting the bundle of rights 
to provide for financial and attributional components). In contrast to my suggestion of splitting the 
reward based on the phase of the innovation process, Fromer suggests granting attributional rights at 
the individual level and granting financial rewards at the firm level.  
318 As discussed above, financial rewards may be effective for motivating individuals to engage in 
the routine activities associated with commercialization, and are also likely effective for motivating 
large rational-actor firms who may play a more prominent role in the commercialization phase of 
innovation. To fully satisfy commercialization theory, then, the financial reward might itself be split 
such that key contributing employees at large firms receive a proportion of the monetary reward 
awarded to the commercializing firm.  
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To be optimally effective, an attributional reward granted at the early 
stages of innovation must achieve the motivating ends of reputational 
enhancement, positive competition, and competence feedback suggested 
by the behavioral literature. The current patent system, which provides for 
minimal attribution by listing inventors on patents that may or may not be 
read by a wide audience, is likely insufficient for these purposes.319 
Instead, a thoughtfully tailored attributional reward could involve periodic 
announcements or press releases providing inventor biographies and 
summarizing their inventions. A more sophisticated system might operate 
in a manner similar to the scientific publication process, with inventions 
evaluated for quality and scientific impact by a committee or an inventor’s 
peers; inventions deemed more significant would receive some special 
treatment designed to enhance reputational effects—wider circulation, for 
example, or an interview with the popular press. This type of system would 
provide inventors with a positive competitive goal as well as reputation 
feedback,320 and would also help satisfy natural rights and personality 
concerns by giving inventors credit and acclaim for their work.321    
An attributional reward, though low-cost compared to our current 
patent system, might bear its own price. Empirical work by Christopher 
Sprigman and colleagues suggests that strengthening attribution in the 
intellectual property context might increase transaction costs because 
creators value attribution more highly where it is granted as a default right. 
This makes it more difficult to bargain with creators for the use of their 
creations without attribution.322 But these costs need not be implicated if 
attribution is structured as described above, such that the inventor is 
credited once, in a very public way, rather than every time the product is 
used.    
D.  Beyond Patents 
Besides attribution, behavioral research suggests that additional non-
financial interventions may have positive effects on innovation. In 
particular, the research highlighted in my discussions of commercialization 
and social planning theory above underscores the importance of facilitating 
innovative environments that promote autonomy, competence, relatedness, 
and self-expression323—what psychologists refer to as “autonomy-
supportive” environments.324 In the context of commercialization theory, 
this research suggests that facilitating these environments can be even 
                                                                                                                          
319 See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1792. 
320 See supra Parts II.B.5, III.B.2. 
321 See supra Parts II.C.2, III.C.1. 
322 Sprigman et al., supra note 275, at 1430–32.  
323 See supra Parts III.B.4, III.C.3. 
324 Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73–74.  
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more effective than financial rewards for motivating individuals to engage 
in the routine work that often accompanies commercialization.325 In the 
context of social planning theory, this research suggests that facilitating 
these environments can have positive effects on creative output.326  
It is thus worth thinking about what can be done at various levels to 
promote autonomy-supportive environments. In the case of the innovative 
behavior that takes place in private firms, the firms themselves may be in 
the best position to facilitate these environments.327 Because firms stand to 
gain financially through increased productivity and higher quality output 
from making these changes, educating them about the potential benefits 
might be sufficient to effect positive change. 
For innovative behavior that takes place in publically funded 
institutions such as universities, drafting funding policies that give 
researchers autonomy in project choice and provide opportunities for 
collaborative work could prove beneficial.328 Universities themselves, as 
employers, could also undertake initiatives designed to enhance the 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness of their researchers.  
For innovative behavior that takes place on an unstructured level, we 
are currently seeing the rise of autonomy-supportive innovation 
environments—featuring the key components of autonomy, relatedness, 
self-expression, and competence feedback—on the internet.329 
Communities and governments can also do their part to facilitate these 
environments by providing informational (e.g., listings of groups with 
shared interests) or physical (e.g., meeting places) resources to innovation-
minded individuals.     
E.  Caveats 
Before concluding, two caveats of this work must be reiterated. First, 
the conclusions drawn here are based entirely on behavioral research and 
do not take into account the various economic or rights arguments that 
have been advanced for and against the various accounts of the patent 
system. Nevertheless, this analysis is not necessarily mutually exclusive of, 
or inconsistent with, these other types of arguments.330 Future efforts could 
integrate these arguments with other strains of analysis.  
                                                                                                                          
325 See supra Part III.B.4. 
326 See supra Part III.C.3. 
327 See supra Part III.B.4.b.ii. 
328 See supra Part III.C.3.c. 
329 See John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
203, 204 (2008) (relating the rise of amateur production of information and innovation to the 
availability of free or quasi-free distributional channels, the most significant of which is the internet). 
330 See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 857 (arguing that a socio-historical approach to patent law 
can complement more traditional approaches). 
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Second, the analysis here focuses primarily on the level of individual 
incentives, while a significant amount of innovative behavior currently 
occurs in the context of organizations. The general response to this is two-
fold. First, organizations are made up of individuals.331 To the extent that 
individuals within organizations are motivated by non-financial 
considerations, firms benefit from lower costs and higher productivity, and 
the corresponding financial reward necessary to incentivize the 
(presumably) rational-actor employer should be lowered.332 Second, as 
technology improves, more avenues for innovation and commercialization 
are opening to individuals.333 Thus, individual-level incentives may be 
poised to gain greater salience over time. 
Of course, more work can be done to determine the answers to 
questions such as: How closely do firm-level behavioral incentives track 
individual incentives? Do firm incentives change as a function of firm 
size? How do individual-level and firm-level behavioral incentives 
interact? As the answers to these questions are clarified, we can tailor the 
patent system so as to bring it more fully in line with the behavior of actors 
within the system, thereby minimizing the system’s social costs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As shown here, research from the behavioral sciences provides a tool 
for measuring theoretical accounts of the patent system against the 
expected behaviors of actors responding to the system in real life. It thus 
helps us answer the pressing question of whether patent rights are justified, 
and if so, for what purpose. My analysis here suggests that, at least 
according to the behavioral literature, our current patent system is best 
justified as a means of promoting commercialization activities.  
Beyond this, the Article also demonstrates that a behavioral framework 
can bring us closer to an ideal patent system—one that promotes 
innovation through mechanisms like disclosure and competition while at 
the same time satisfying moral concerns like justice and personality 
interests. My analysis suggests that this can be accomplished by 
developing a patent system that offers attributional and financial rewards at 
different times to different actors in a manner that takes advantage of the 
psychological factors that govern the innovation process.    
Finally, the behavioral analysis undertaken here provides support for 
broad interventions outside the traditional patent system—including 
changes to our approach to research funding—to foster innovation-
supportive environments. All of these insights, taken together, have the 
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potential to direct innovation policy in ways that align more closely with 
the realities of human creativity and decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

